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BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: WHAT REALLY
HAPPENS WHEN COPS QUESTION KIDS
Barry C. Feld*
Much of what passes for knowledge about police interviewing prac-
tices is no more than assumption and conjecture.  Such knowledge prob-
ably owes more to television, films, or novels than to any informed
understanding of what happens in police interview rooms.  Because of
the secrecy that has always surrounded police-suspect interviews and the
traditional reluctance of police officers to allow outsiders access to the
interview room, debates on the crucial questions of interview procedures
had to be conducted in something of an information vacuum.1
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INTRODUCTION
Police interrogation raises difficult legal, normative, and policy
questions because of the State’s need to solve crimes and obligation to
protect citizens’ rights.  These issues become even more problematic
when police question juveniles.  For more than a century, justice policies
have reflected two competing visions of youth: vulnerable and immature
versus responsible and adult-like.  A century ago, Progressive reformers
emphasized youths’ immaturity and created a separate juvenile court to
shield children from criminal trials and punishment.2  By the end of the
twentieth century, lawmakers adopted “get tough” policies, which
equated adolescents with adults and punished youths more severely.3
2 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 46 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS] (noting that Reformers characterized children
as irresponsible and incompetent).
3 See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1558–73 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race,
Politics, and Juvenile Justice] (describing “get tough” changes in waiver and sentencing poli-
cies); Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for Juveniles
Sentences to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9, 11–16 (2008)
[hereinafter Feld, A Slower Form of Death] (changing waiver policies).
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Over the past three decades, these changes have transformed the juvenile
court from a social welfare agency into a second-class criminal court.4
The direct results—institutional confinement—and collateral conse-
quences—transfer to criminal court, use of delinquency convictions to
enhance sentences, or sex offender registration—preclude fewer protec-
tions for interrogating juveniles than questioning adults.5
For more than a century, the Supreme Court’s interrogation deci-
sions attempted to balance the state’s need for information from suspects
with protecting autonomy and freedom from police coercion.  The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the bulwark of the ad-
versary process and presumes equality between the individual and the
state.6  The Court has used three constitutional strategies—Fourteenth
Amendment due process voluntariness, Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, and Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination—to regu-
late interrogation, restrict coercive pressures, and preserve the adversarial
balance.7  The Court in Miranda v. Arizona used the Fifth Amendment to
4 See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2, at 287–90 (analyzing punitive transformation of R
juvenile justice policies); Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure
for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141, 151–64 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice] (analyzing constitutional decisions and procedural convergence); Barry C.
Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV 821, 850–79 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, The Juvenile Court
Meets the Principle of Offense] (analyzing sentencing statutes and shift in emphasis from of-
fender to offense).
5 See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sen-
tence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1203–1214 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Constitutional
Tension] (examining using delinquency convictions to enhance criminal sentences); see also
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986) (recognizing that “the State intended to punish its
juvenile offenders”); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (applying Double Jeopardy
Clause to delinquency adjudications because “there is little to distinguish an adjudicatory hear-
ing . . . from a traditional criminal prosecution”).
6 The theoretical idea of an adversarial model is that a passive umpire adjudicates a
dispute between two equal parties: the state and defendant. See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of
Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 524 (1975).  The Fifth
Amendment privilege furthers three interrelated values.  One is to promote factual accuracy—
to insure the reliability of the process. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967) (“The privilege
against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to
assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere
fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth.”).  A second is to prevent
governmental oppression by making the individual unavailable to the state as a source of
evidence and limiting the pressure the state can bring to bear on the individual in pursuit of its
own goals. See id. (“One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psycho-
logical domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation and
depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.”).
Third, the adversarial process promotes respect for individual dignity and autonomy. See id.
7 The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment due process decisions focus on whether a sus-
pect’s statement was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.  Mark A. Godsey, Re-
thinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled
Self-Incrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 490–91 (2005). See generally Developments in the
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fashion the Miranda warning, protecting suspects from the compulsive
pressures of custodial interrogation.8  Over three decades, Miranda doc-
trine has transmogrified from a safeguard for suspects to a safe-harbor
for police.  If police warn a suspect and secure a waiver, then courts will
admit nearly every subsequent statement regardless of the tactics used to
obtain it.9
Despite the importance of interrogation, we know remarkably little
about what actually happens when police question suspects.  Police,
prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges do not have the time or training
to systematically analyze interrogation practices.  Police have resisted in-
cursions into interrogation rooms by behavioral scientists, whom they
regard as potential critics.10  Law professors, psychologists, and crimi-
nologists who write about interrogation lack access to venues where po-
lice question suspects.  Appellate courts base rules of interrogation on a
biased sample of unrepresentative cases.  Most of what we think we
know about interrogation derives from aberrational cases—false-confes-
sions and wrongful convictions—or from television programs and mov-
ies that misleadingly depict police questioning suspects.  In the four
decades since Miranda, we have few empirical studies about what actu-
ally happens in an interrogation room, and none about how police ques-
tion juveniles.11
This Article begins to fill the empirical void.12  It focuses on the
role of interrogation at the inquisitorial heart of our nominally adversarial
Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 954–84 (1966) (discussing the shift from common
law to due process analyses of voluntariness).  The Court excluded statements police elicited
by psychological or physical coercion because they were unreliable, overwhelmed a person’s
free will, and used tactics a free society cannot condone.
The Court’s Sixth Amendment decisions concluded that suspects needed tactical and stra-
tegic advice of counsel at interrogation because a confession was a critical stage that deter-
mined the outcome of proceedings. E.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1965).
8 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966) (extending the Fifth Amendment privilege to the interro-
gation room and requiring police to advise suspects of the rights to remain silent and to assis-
tance of counsel).
9 See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004); Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428, 544 (2000); infra note 339 and accompanying text. R
10 See REBECCA MILNE & RAY BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: PSYCHOLOGY AND
PRACTICE 74 (1999) [hereinafter MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING].
11 See Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Study of Policy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 52 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles’
Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights]; Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An
Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 222 (2006)
[hereinafter Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles]; Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Po-
lice Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 263 (1996) [hereinafter
Leo, Miranda’s Revenge]; see infra notes 113–120 and accompanying text. R
12 This article is part of a larger study that examines police interrogation practices, how
juveniles respond to their questioners, the impact of Miranda waivers on case processing, the
role of parents at interrogations, and the impact of geographic locale, race, and gender on
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process.13  It analyzes quantitative and qualitative data of 307 interroga-
tions police conducted of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths whom
prosecutors charged with felonies.  Unlike most states, Minnesota has
required police to record interrogations for nearly two decades.14  The
tapes and transcripts enable me to describe what happens when police
interrogate serious young offenders.  These analyses also test develop-
mental psychologists’ hypotheses about adolescents’ competence to ex-
ercise Miranda rights.  For three decades, psychologists have questioned
whether young people possess the competence to exercise rights.  While
their research demonstrates younger and mid-adolescent youths are not
as competent as adults, it suggests most youths sixteen years of age and
older understand Miranda on par with adults.
Part I reviews the law governing interrogation of juveniles and con-
trasts it with psychologists assessments of juveniles’ competence to exer-
cise rights.  Part II examines interrogation practices, post-Miranda
impact-studies and empirical research on interrogation.  Part III describes
the study’s data and methodology.  Part IV presents quantitative and
qualitative data about what happens when police question serious offend-
ers.  It focuses on juveniles’ waivers of Miranda rights, techniques police
use to question them, length of interrogations, and outcomes.  Part V
recommends policy changes based on these analyses.
I. INTERROGATING JUVENILES
The Supreme Court has decided more cases about interrogating
youths than any other issue in juvenile justice.15  Although the Court has
repeatedly cautioned that youthfulness adversely affects juveniles’ ability
to exercise Miranda or make voluntary statements, it has not required
special procedures to protect young suspects.  Rather, it endorsed the
adult waiver standard of “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary” to gauge
juveniles’ Miranda waivers.16
police practices. See BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE INTERROGA-
TION ROOM (2013) [hereinafter FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS].
13 Constitutional theory notwithstanding, American criminal and juvenile justice is an
inquisitorial system for nearly all offenders. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION 239 (1968) (“[T]he real-world criminal process tends to be far more administra-
tive and managerial than adversary and judicial.”).  Police establish most defendants’ guilt
through informal, administrative fact-finding, i.e. interrogation, see id. at 187–90, 192, that
leads to pleas, see id. at 222–23, 225.  A guilty plea in court simply ratifies the real trial that
occurred when police questioned the suspect. See id. at 222–23; infra note 388 and accompa- R
nying text.
14 See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994) (requiring police to record all
custodial interrogations of criminal suspects, including juveniles).
15 See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49
(1962); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Yarborough
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
16 See Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725–26.
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A. Interrogating Juveniles: Youthful Vulnerability and Adult
Standards
In the decades prior to Miranda, the Court adopted a protectionist
stance and cautioned trial judges to examine closely how youthfulness
affected the voluntariness of confessions.17  The Court in Haley v. Ohio
found involuntary the confession of a fifteen-year old boy whose youth
and inexperience left him vulnerable18 to “overpowering” police interro-
gation.19  The Gallegos v. Colorado Court found age was a special cir-
cumstance20 that rendered a fourteen-year-old boy’s confession
involuntary.21  In In re Gault, the Court reiterated its concerns over
youthfulness adversely affecting the voluntariness of juveniles’ state-
ments.22  The Gault Court granted delinquents most procedural rights—
notice, hearing, counsel, and cross-examination—based on Fourteenth
Amendment due process.23  It also granted Fifth Amendment privilege
17 Supreme Court decisions about youth reflect competing liberationist and protectionist
policies. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2, at 106–08; Jessica Owen-Kostelnik et al., Testimony R
and Interrogation of Minors: Assumptions About Maturity and Morality, 61 AM. PSYCHOL.
286, 287–90 (2006).  A paternalistic stance protects children from their own immature judg-
ment, provides them additional safeguards, and denies rights because of their presumed inabil-
ity to exercise them responsibly. Id. at 288.  A liberationist model portrays youths as
autonomous and adult-like and treats them as it does other responsible actors. Id.
18 Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–600 (“That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed
can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.  This is the period of great instability
which the crisis of adolescence produces. . . .  [W]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is
a match for the police in such a contest.  He needs counsel and support if he is not to become
the victim first of fear, then of panic.”).
19 Id. at 600–01 (“The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration of
his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him, the callous attitude of the
police toward his rights combine to convince us that this was a confession wrung from a child
by means which the law should not sanction.”).
20 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (“[A] 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated . . . is not
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding . . . and . . . is unable to know how to
protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights. . . .  Without
some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had.”).
21 Id. at 55 (“The youth of the petitioner, the long detention, the failure to send for his
parents, the failure immediately to bring him before the judge of the Juvenile Court, the failure
to see to it that he had the advice of a lawyer or a friend—all these combine to make us
conclude that the formal confession on which this conviction may have rested was obtained in
violation of due process.”).
22 See 387 U.S. 1, 52 (1967) (“[A]uthoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon
the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.”); see also Thomas Grisso,
Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 1134,
1137 (1980) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights] (“Gault rec-
ognized that even greater protection might be required where juveniles are involved, since
their immaturity and greater vulnerability place them at a greater disadvantage in their dealings
with the police.”).
23 Gault, 387 U.S. at 30; Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 4, at 154–55 R
(analyzing constitutional bases for Court’s juvenile due process decisions).
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against self-incrimination in delinquency proceedings.24  It recognized
that the Fifth Amendment contributes to accurate fact-finding and main-
tains the adversarial balance between the individual and the state.25
The Court’s due process decisions fostered a convergence between
juvenile and criminal courts and converted the former into a scaled-down
criminal court.26  Some analysts advocate relaxed safeguards in juvenile
courts to foster a rehabilitative or preventive mission.27  In the words of
two such analysts:
Permitting a juvenile to remain silent during interroga-
tion or trial could easily reduce reliability and efficiency
in the typical case, concerns that arguably trump the
lesser autonomy interests at stake in the juvenile con-
text. . . .  [M]any technical rules that have developed
around Miranda would not need to be followed by law
enforcement officials.28
24 Gault, 387 U.S. at 49–50.  In extending the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to delinquency proceedings, the Court held:
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all state-
ments by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to “criminal” involvement.
In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine “delinquency,” which may lead
to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as “criminal” for purposes of
the privilege against self-incrimination.
Id.
25 Id. at 47.  The Court recognized a number of significant benefits of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination:
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the question of
the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably
trustworthy, that they are not mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expres-
sions of the truth. . . .  One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or
by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person
under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the
state in securing his convictions.
Id.
26 Subsequent decisions further criminalized delinquency proceedings. See In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring states to prove delinquents’ guilt by the criminal law’s
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (positing a
functional equivalence of criminal and delinquency trials); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (denying delinquents the right to a jury trial).  However, Gault and Winship
provided impetus to transform the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into a scaled-
down criminal court.  Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 4, at 161–62; see FELD, R
BAD KIDS, supra note 2, at 106–07; see also Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of R
Offense, supra note 4, at 829–831. R
27 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott and Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due
Process, and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793 (2005) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso,
Developmental Incompetence] (advocating lower standard for competency in juvenile than in
criminal court).
28 CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 116–17 (2011); see also Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence,
supra note 27, at 796 (advocating a reduced competency standard in juvenile court). R
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However, the Supreme Court’s opinions in In re Winship and Breed v.
Jones recognized juvenile courts’ criminal aspects, and Gault highlighted
their adversarial character.
The Court in Fare v. Michael C. held that the “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test used to evaluate adults’ waivers governed juveniles’
waivers as well.29  By the Court’s reasoning, Miranda provided an objec-
tive basis to evaluate waivers.30  The Court denied that youths’ develop-
mental differences required special procedural protections31 and required
children to assert their rights clearly.32
Miranda provided that if police question a suspect who is in cus-
tody—arrested or “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way”—they must administer a warning.33  The Court in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina considered “whether the Miranda custody analysis includes
consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age,”34 and reasoned that age was
an objective fact that would affect whether a person felt restrained.35
Most state courts use Michael C.’s totality framework for juveniles
and adults.36  Trial judges consider characteristics of the offender—age,
education, I.Q., and prior police contacts—and the context of interroga-
tion—location, methods, and length of questioning—when they evaluate
Miranda waivers.37  Appellate courts do not assign controlling weight to
29 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (holding that a request for a probation officer did not invoke
Miranda’s privilege against self-incrimination or right to counsel).  The Court decided
Michael C. as a Miranda case rather than as a juvenile interrogation case.  Kenneth J. King,
Waiving Childhood Goodbye: How Courts Fail to Protect Children from Unknowing, Unintel-
ligent, and Involuntary Waivers of Miranda Rights, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 431, 449 (2006).
30 Michael C., 442 U.S. at 724–25.
31 See id. at 729–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should have
adopted broader protection of juvenile suspects by holding that a juvenile’s request for any
person who represents their interests be treated as a Fifth Amendment invocation).
32 See id. at 723–24 (deciding that a juvenile’s request to see a trusted adult is not an
invocation of Fifth Amendment rights); see also Francis Barry McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory
Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457,
461 (1981); Irene Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with
Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 686–91
(1980).
33 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
34 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011); see also id. at 2406 (conclud-
ing that courts should consider how a thirteen-year-old youth’s age would affect his feelings of
custodial restraint).
35 Id.  “[A] reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pres-
sured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.  We think it clear that courts
can account for that reality.” Id.
36 King, supra note 29, at 456; Kimberly Larson, Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”: A R
Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 645 &
n.91, 646 (2003) (summarizing the majority of states’ use of the “totality of circumstances”
test and the factors they consider).
37 See, e.g., Michael C., 442 U.S. at 727 (1979); West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467,
469 (5th Cir. 1968).
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any factor,38 and the totality approach provides no meaningful check on
trial judges’ discretion.39  Judges find valid waivers by children as young
as ten years of age with no prior police contacts, with limited intelli-
gence, and without parental assistance.40  About ten states require a par-
ent to assist juveniles in the interrogation room,41 although commentators
question the policy assumptions or utility of their participation.42  The
Minnesota Supreme Court has rejected a parental presence requirement
and uses Michael C.’s totality approach to gauge juveniles’ Miranda
waivers.43
38 FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2, at 118. R
39 Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommenda-
tions, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 11 (2010) [hereinafter Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confes-
sions].  Trial judges failed to recognize juveniles’ claims that waivers were involuntary or
confessions coerced even when DNA evidence subsequently exonerated them.  Brandon L.
Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 88–91 (2008) [hereinafter Garrett, Judg-
ing Innocence].  In practice, judges invalidate waivers or exclude confessions only under the
most egregious circumstances. FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 2, at 118; Barry C. Feld, R
Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH
ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 105, 113 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights].
40 See Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 39, at 112–13; Feld, R
Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra note 11, at 32 n.18; Feld, Police R
Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 11, at 224 n.19; King, supra note 29, at 456–57. R
41 Hillary B. Farber, The Role of the Parent/Guardian in Juvenile Custodial Interroga-
tions: Friend or Foe?, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1277, 1287 n.65 (2004) (listing the states with
parental presence requirements); King, supra note 29, at 451–52; see Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver R
of Legal Rights, supra note 39, at 116–18; see, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312–13 R
(Kan. 1998) (protecting youths younger than 14); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d
654, 657 (Mass. 1983) (requiring parent or appropriate adult); State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108,
1114, 1117 (N.J. 2000) (requiring parent for younger juveniles); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937,
940 (Vt. 1982) (holding as a matter of state constitutional law that a youth “must be given the
opportunity to consult with an adult”).
42 States assume that a parent will understand rights, provide legal advice, mitigate coer-
cive influences, prevent unreliable statements, and reduce feelings of isolation.  Feld,
Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights, supra note 39, at 117–18; see Lisa M. Krzewinski, But I R
Didn’t Do It: Protecting the Rights of Juveniles During Interrogation, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 355, 374–77 (2002). See generally Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the
Juvenile Confession Front: A Guide to How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Pro-
duce Coerced and False Confessions from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFES-
SIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 153–55 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (endorsing a parental
presence requirement even though interrogators reduce parents’ role to passive observer); Far-
ber, supra note 41.  Parents may pressure their children to tell the truth and confess. See R
THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE
180–81 (1981) [hereinafter GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS]; Thomas Grisso & Me-
lissa Ring, Parents’ Attitudes Toward Juveniles’ Right in Interrogation, 6 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 211, 213–14 (1979).
43 See, e.g., State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 597 (Minn. 2005) (noting that repeatedly
requesting a parent before and after a Miranda warning may render a waiver or statement
involuntary); State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1980); State v. Loyd, 212 N.W.2d
671, 677 (Minn. 1973).
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B. Developmental Psychology, Judgment, and Self-Control
Roper v. Simmons barred states from executing offenders for murder
they committed when younger than eighteen years of age because of re-
duced culpability.44 Graham v. Florida extended Roper and banned life
without parole sentences for non-homicide crimes.45 Miller v. Alabama
and Jackson v. Hobbs banned mandatory life sentences without parole
for youths who kill.46  The Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence
reasoned that states could not punish youths as severely as adults.  The
Court attributed juveniles’ tendency to act impulsively and without full
appreciation of consequences to their immature judgment and limited
self-control.47  Greater susceptibility to peer influences diminished their
criminal responsibility.48  These developmental characteristics—imma-
turity, impulsivity, and susceptibility to social influences—heighten
youths’ vulnerability in the interrogation room.
Developmental psychologists distinguish between cognitive ability
and maturity of judgment.  The former bears on youths’ ability to under-
stand and make a knowing and intelligent waiver and the latter on volun-
tariness and susceptibility to coercive pressures. By mid-adolescence,
most youths’ cognitive abilities compare with adults—they can distin-
guish right from wrong and reason similarly.49  However, the ability to
44 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). Roper attributed their reduced culpabil-
ity to three factors:
[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults . . . .  [T]hese qualities often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions; (2) [J]uveniles are more vulnerable or suscepti-
ble to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure; and (3)
[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.  The personal-
ity traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.
Id. See generally Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 3 (analyzing the Court’s three R
rationales to support reduced culpability).
45 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (“Developments in psychology and
brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.  For
example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.”).
46 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). See generally Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Re-
sponsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the
Youth Discount, 31 J. LAW & INEQUALITY 263 (2013) (analyzing sentencing policy implica-
tions of the Court’s “children are different” jurisprudence).
47 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
48 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
49 See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 389, 407–09 (1999) [hereinafter Steinberg & Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom];
see also ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 164
(2008) [ hereinafter SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE] (comparing cogni-
tive competence of adolescents and adults); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less
Mature Than Adults?  Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Al-
leged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2009) [hereinafter Steinberg et al., Are
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make good choices with complete information in a laboratory differs
from the ability to make adult-like decisions under stressful conditions
with incomplete information.50  Research conducted by the MacArthur
Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile
Justice distinguishes between cognitive ability and psychosocial maturity
of judgment—risk assessment, temporal orientation, capacity for self-
regulation, and susceptibility to external influences.51  While most
youths sixteen years of age or older exhibit cognitive abilities compara-
ble with adults, they do not develop mature judgment and adult-like com-
petence to make decisions until their twenties.52
1. Immature Judgment and Risk Perception
Youths’ short- and long-term time perspective, risk perception, and
appreciation of future consequences differ from adults.53  Differences in
Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?] (noting that the American Psychological Association
affirmed the maturity of adolescent girls to make abortion decisions without parental
assistance).
50 See L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 417, 423 (2000) (“[U]nlike adults, adolescents may
exhibit considerably poorer cognitive performance under circumstances involving everyday
stress and time-limited situations than under optimal test conditions.” (citation omitted)); Lau-
rence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychological
Factors in Adolescent Decision-Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 812–13 (1996) [herein-
after Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence] (“These findings from
laboratory studies are only modestly useful, however, in understanding how youths compare to
adults in making choices that have salience to their lives or that are presented in stressful
unstructured settings (such as the street) in which decision-makers must rely on personal expe-
rience and knowledge.”); see also Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults?,
supra note 49, at 586 (“[W]hereas adolescents and adults perform comparably on cognitive R
tests measuring the sorts of cognitive abilities . . . that permit logical reasoning about moral,
social, and interpersonal matters—adolescents and adults are not of equal maturity with re-
spect to the psychosocial capacities . . . such as impulse control and resistance to peer
influence.”).
51 Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON ADO-
LESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST., http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_brief_3.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2013); see also SCOTT & STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
49, at 160–165; Feld, A Slower Form of Death, supra note 3, at 31–32 (summarizing Adoles- R
cent Development and Juvenile Justice research).
52 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799,
811–17 (2003) [hereinafter Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth] (“Psycho-social development
proceeds more slowly than cognitive development.”); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott,
Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1011–14, 1016–17 (2003).
53 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 52, at 813 (“[E]ven when adoles- R
cent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful decision-making may still dif-
fer due to immature judgment.  The psychosocial factors most relevant to differences in
judgment include: (a) peer orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal
perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management. . . .  [I]mmature judgment can affect out-
comes because these developmental factors influence adolescent values and preferences that
drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of choices.”).
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knowledge, experience, and impulse control contribute to poorer deci-
sions.54  A person must be able to think ahead, delay gratification, and
restrain impulses to exercise good judgment, and adolescents underesti-
mate risks, use a shorter frame, and focus on gains rather than losses.55
Sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds are more present-oriented and perceive
fewer risks than do either younger or older subjects.56  Youth regard not
engaging in risky behaviors differently than do adults because the appe-
tite for risk peaks at sixteen or seventeen years of age and then declines
into adulthood.57
2. Neuroscience: Judgment and Impulse Control
Neuroscientists attribute differences in how adolescents and adults
think and behave to brain maturation.58  The prefrontal cortex (PFC) of
54 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 52, at 814 (“Future orientation, the R
capacity and inclination to project events into the future, may also influence judgment, since it
will affect the extent to which individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions
in making choices.”); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in
Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 227 (1995); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas
Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Re-
form, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160–61 (1997) [hereinafter Scott & Grisso, The
Evolution of Adolescence].
55 See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Mak-
ing Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 19 (1992); William Gardner, A Life-Span Ra-
tional-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING 66 (Nancy J. Bell &
Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths’ Capacities as Trial
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139,
160–62 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter Grisso, What We
Know].
56 See Development and Criminal Blameworthiness, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NET. ON
ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUV. JUST., http://www.adjj.org/downloads/3030PPT- Adolescent Devel-
opment and Criminal Blameworthiness.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2013) (graph entitled “Impul-
sivity Declines with Age”); Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, supra
note 52, at 1012. R
57 Risky behavior provides excitement and an adrenaline rush.  Emotions affect decision-
making and researchers distinguish between choices made under conditions of “cold” and
“hot” cognition or states or arousal. See Jay D. Aronson, Brain Imaging Culpability and the
Juvenile Death Penalty, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115, 119 (2007) (“[A]dolescents are
much less capable of making sound decisions when under stressful conditions or when peer
pressure is strong.  Psychosocial researchers have referred to cognitition in these different con-
texts as cold versus hot.”); Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behav-
ioral/Emotional Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60, 61 (2001) (“Cold cognition
refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion and/or arousal, whereas hot cognition refers
to thinking under conditions of strong feelings or high arousal.”); Steinberg et al., Are Adoles-
cents Less Mature Than Adults?, supra note 49, at 586.  Mood volatility, an appetite for excite- R
ment, and stress adversely affect adolescents’ decisions to a greater degree than they do adults.
See Spear, supra note 50, at 421–23, 428–29; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Rea- R
soning in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1607 (1992).
58 See Dahl, supra note 57, at 69 (“Regions in the PFC [prefrontal cortex] that underpin R
higher cognitive-executive functions mature slowly, showing functional changes that continue
well into late adolescence/adulthood.”); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Mapping Continued Brain
Growth and Gray Matter Density Reduction in Dorsal Frontal Cortex: Inverse Relationships
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the frontal lobe of the brain regulates executive functions such as abstract
thinking, strategic planning, and impulse control—skills necessary to ex-
ercise legal rights.59  The amygdala (the limbic system) controls emo-
tional and instinctual behavior—the fight-or-flight response—and in
stressful situations, adolescents rely more heavily on the amygdala and
less heavily on the PFC than do adults.60  Novel circumstances and emo-
tional arousal challenge youths’ ability to exercise self-control.61 Gra-
ham noted that impaired judgment, risk-calculus, and short-term
perspective adversely affected youths’ ability to exercise rights and im-
paired defense representation.62
During Postadolescent Brain Maturation, 21 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8819 (2001) [hereinafter Sow-
ell et al., Mapping Continued Brain Growth] (discussing significant changes in brain structure
prior to adulthood); Spear, supra note 50, at 438 (“[T]he adolescent brain is a brain in flux, R
undergoing numerous regressive and progressive changes in mesocorticolimbic regions.”).
59 See Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A
Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 323 (2006) (“The frontal cortex has been
shown to play a major role in the performance of executive functions including short term or
working memory, motor set and planning, attention, inhibitory control and decision making.”);
Toma´s Paus et al., Structural Maturation of Neural Pathways in Children and Adolescents: In
Vivo Study, 283 SCIENCE 1908, 1908–10 (1999).
60 See David E. Arrendondo, Child Development, Children’s Mental Health and the Ju-
venile Justice System: Principles for Effective Decision-Making, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
13, 15 (2003) (“Adolescents tend to process emotionally charged decisions in the limbic sys-
tem, the part of the brain charged with instinctive (and often impulsive) reactions.  Most adults
use more of their frontal cortex, the part of the brain responsible for reasoned and thoughtful
responses.  This is one reason why adolescents tend to be more intensely emotional, impulsive,
and willing to take risks than their adult counterparts.”); Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J.
AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 198 (1999).
61 See Scott & Steinberg, Blaming Youth, supra note 52, at 816, (summarize the interac- R
tion between the PFC—the executive functions—and the limbic system—associated with im-
pulsive or instinctual behavior).
[R]egions of the brain implicated in processes of long-term planning, regulation of
emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of risk and reward continue to mature
over the course of adolescence, and perhaps well into young adulthood.  At puberty,
changes in the limbic system—a part of the brain that is central in the processing and
regulation of emotion—may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty
and to take more risks; these changes also may contribute to increased emotionality
and vulnerability to stress.  At the same time, patterns of development in the
prefrontal cortex, which is active during the performance of complicated tasks in-
volving planning and decision-making, suggest that these higher-order cognitive ca-
pacities may be immature well into middle adolescence.
Id.; see also Allison Redlich et al., Pre-Adjudicative and Adjudicative Competence in
Juveniles and Young Adults, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 393, 403 (2003) [hereinafter Redlich et al.,
Pre-Adjudicative and Adjudicative Competence].
62 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (“[T]he features that distinguish
juveniles from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. . . .
Difficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance
to trust defense counsel seen as part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects, all can lead to
poor decisions by one charged with a juvenile offense.”).
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C. Juveniles’ Ability to Meet Legal Standards
Despite the Court’s repeated references to developmental differ-
ences, most states use adult legal standards to gauge juveniles’ Miranda
waivers.  If youths differ from adults in understanding Miranda, in abil-
ity to exercise rights, or in susceptibility to social influences, then the law
may hold them to a standard that few can meet.  Some juveniles simply
do not understand the words of Miranda warnings.  Police use hundreds
of versions of the Miranda warning.63  Psychologists contend that the
vocabulary, concepts, and reading levels required to understand Miranda
exceed the ability of many adolescents.64  Some concepts—the meaning
of a right, the term appointed to secure counsel, and waive—require a
high-school education and render Miranda incomprehensible to many
juveniles.65  Dumbed-down juvenile warnings often are longer than those
used for adults and inhibit understanding.66
1. Understanding Miranda: Knowing and Intelligent
Thomas Grisso has studied juveniles’ ability to exercise Miranda
rights for more than three decades and reports that many youths do not
adequately understand the warning.67  Half (55.3%) of juveniles, as con-
63 See Richard Rogers et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Compre-
hension and Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177, 181 (2007) [hereinafter Rogers et al., An
Analysis of Miranda Warnings].
64 See Richard Rogers et al., The Comprehensibility and Content of Juvenile Miranda
Warnings, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 63, 72–85 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers et at., Compre-
hensibility and Content]; see also Richard Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings
in American Jurisdictions: A Replication and Vocabulary Analysis, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
124, 135 (2008) [hereinafter Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings].  Key words
and concepts of a warning require at least an eighth-grade level of education to understand,
and juveniles thirteen years of age or younger cannot grasp its meaning. See Rogers et al.,
Comprehensibility and Content, supra, at 72.
65 See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 64, at 74 tbl.3, 76 tbl.4.
Many juveniles cannot define critical words used in Miranda warnings. See id. at 72–75. See
generally ALAN M. GOLDSTEIN & NAOMI E. SEVIN GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO
WAIVE Miranda Rights (2010) [hereinafter GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY
TO WAIVE Miranda].
66 See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 64, at 71 (comparing R
lengths of juvenile and adult Miranda warnings).
67 GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 106–07; Grisso, Juveniles’ R
Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 22, at 1152–54; Thomas Grisso, The Compe- R
tence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3, 11 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents] (noting adolescents’ difficulty in grasping the
concept of a right as an entitlement); J. Thomas Grisso & Carolyn Pomiciter, Interrogation of
Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977) [hereinafter Grisso & Pomiciter, Interrogation of Juveniles]; Thomas
Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 335 (2003) [hereinafter Grisso
et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial]; Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Consent in Delin-
quency Proceedings, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131 (Gary B. Melton et al.
eds., 1983) [hereinafter Grisso, Juveniles’ Consent in Delinquency Proceedings]. See gener-
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trasted with less than one-quarter (23.1%) of adults, did not understand at
least one of the warnings and only one-fifth (20.9%) of juveniles, as
compared with almost half (42.3%) of adults, grasped the entire warn-
ing.68  Sixteen- and seventeen-year-old juveniles understood Miranda
about as well as did adults, but substantial minorities of both groups mis-
understood some components.69  Age-related improvements in compre-
hension appear in other studies.70  Younger teens consistently understood
Miranda even less well than did those in their mid-teens.71 Miranda’s
language put the warning beyond the comprehension of many mid-teen
delinquents,72 and its concepts beyond the grasp of many younger
juveniles.73  Even youths who understand Miranda’s words may be una-
ally THOMAS GRISSO, INSTRUMENTS FOR ASSESSING UNDERSTANDING & APPRECIATION OF Mi-
randa Rights (1998) (providing tests to assess an examinee’s comprehension of the rights
protected by Miranda warnings, the vocabulary of Miranda warnings, and the significance of
Miranda rights in the context of interrogation).
68 Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 22, at 1152–54. R
69 Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 67, at 10–14. R
70 See Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 8 (“[U]nderstanding R
of adolescents ages 15–17 with near-average levels of verbal intelligences tends not to have
been inferior to that of adults.  But youths of that age with IQ scores below 85, and average
youth below age 14, performed much poorer, often misunderstanding two or more of the warn-
ings.”); Jodi Viljoen & Ronald Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights and Adju-
dicative Competence in Adolescent Defendants: Cognitive Development, Attorney Contact,
and Psychological Symptoms, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723, 736 (2005) [hereinafter Viljoen &
Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights] (“Youth’s general intellectual ability, ver-
bal ability, attention, and executive functioning increased with age.  This indicates that young
adolescents may not yet have acquired the cognitive abilities necessary to adequately under-
stand and participate in legal proceedings.”).
71 See Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 22, at 1160 R
(reporting that the majority of juveniles younger than fifteen years of age “failed to meet both
the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehension . . . [and] misunderstood at
least one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with adults, demonstrated
significantly poorer comprehension of the nature and significance of the Miranda rights.”);
Jodi Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension of Miranda Rights in Adoles-
cent Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 1, 9 (2007) [herein-
after Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension] (reporting substantially
impaired understanding by youths younger than sixteen).
72 See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 64, at 80 (“The synergis- R
tic effects of poor reading comprehension, low intelligence, and comorbid mental disorders are
likely to have catastrophic effects on Miranda comprehension and subsequent reasoning.”);
Richard Rogers, A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing . . . Emerging Miranda Research
and Professional Roles for Psychologists, 63 AM. PSYCHOL. 776, 779 (2008) [hereinafter Rog-
ers, A Little Knowledge].
73 See Rona Abramovitch et al., Young People’s Understanding and Assertion of Their
Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel, 37 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 10–11 (1995); Rona
Abramovitch et al., Young Persons’ Comprehension of Waivers in Criminal Proceedings, 35
CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 309, 320 (1993) (arguing that most juveniles do not have sufficient
understanding to be competent to waive Miranda); Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability &
Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15 CRIM. JUST. 26, 28 (2000); Redlich et al.,
Pre-Adjudicative and Adjudicative Competence, supra note 61, at 405; Viljoen & Roesch, R
Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights, supra note 70, at 736; Jodi Viljoen et al., Legal R
Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants: Predictors of Confessions, Pleas,
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ble to exercise the rights as well as adults.  Juveniles do not fully appre-
ciate the function or importance of rights,74 or view them as an
entitlement, rather than as a privilege that authorities allow, but which
they may unilaterally withdraw.75
A person must be able to understand proceedings, make rational
decisions, and assist counsel to be competent to stand trial.76  Develop-
ment limitations impair youths’ competence, similar to how mental ill-
ness or retardation may render adults incompetent.77  Many juveniles
younger than fourteen years of age were as severely impaired as adults
found incompetent to stand trial, and many older adolescents exhibited
substantial impairments.78  Their compromised competence equally af-
fects their ability to exercise Miranda rights.
Communication with Attorneys, and Appeals, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 253, 256 (2005) [here-
inafter Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defendants] (finding
that youths fifteen years of age and younger had poorer understanding and were more likely to
waive rights and confess than older youths).
74 See GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 130; Grisso, The Com- R
petence of Adolescents, supra note 67, at 11 (distinguishing between understanding words of R
warning and appreciating the functions of the rights and a warning conveys); Larson, supra
note 36, at 649–53 (reviewing social psychological research and juveniles’ limited understand- R
ing of the concept of “rights” as entitlements to be exercised).
75 See Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 67, at 10–11 (“[A] larger R
proportion of delinquent youths bring to the defendant role an incomplete comprehension of
the concept and meaning of a right as it applies to adversarial legal proceedings.”); Thomas
Grisso, Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: New Questions for an Era of Punitive Juvenile
Justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: RETHINKING, ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND
SENTENCING FOR A HARSHER ERA OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 29–30 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds.,
2002); GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 130; Grisso, What We Know, R
supra note 55, at 148–49. R
76 See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“[A] person . . . that . . . lacks
the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”); Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (“‘[T]he defendant . . . must . . . ha[ve]
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing . . . [and have] a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings against
him.’”).  Analysts question whether juveniles possess these competencies. See Richard J.
Bonnie & Thomas Grisso, Adjudicative Competence and Youthful Offenders, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 73, 86–89 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra
note 67, at 335. R
77 See Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents, supra note 67, at 20–21; Richard E. Red- R
ding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern Juvenile Court, 9 VA J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 353, 374–78 (2001); Scott & Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, supra note 27, R
at 795–98.
78 See Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings: Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney–Client Relationship, 33 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 652 (1995); Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial,
supra note 67, at 344; Redding & Frost, supra note 77, at 374–78; see also Bonnie & Grisso, R
supra note 76, at 87–88. R
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2. Susceptibility to Adult Authority and Social Influence:
Voluntariness
Roper and Graham emphasized that youths’ susceptibility to social
influences reduced culpability.79 Miranda characterized custodial inter-
rogation as inherently compelling because police dominate the setting,
control information, and create psychological pressures to comply.80
Youths are not full-fledged citizens, and we expect them to answer ques-
tions posed by parents, teachers, police, and other adults.  Children ques-
tioned by authority figures acquiesce more readily to suggestion during
questioning.81  They seek an interviewer’s approval and respond more
readily to negative pressure.82  Under stress of a lengthy interrogation,
they may impulsively confess falsely rather than consider the
consequences.83
79 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 569 (2005).
80 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455–58 (1965). See generally GISLI H.
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK (2003)
[hereinafter GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS]
(“[I]nterrogative suggestibility [is defined] as ‘[t]he extent to which, within a closed social
interaction, people come to accept messages communicated during formal questioning, as the
result of which their subsequent behavioral response is affected.’” (citation omitted)).
81 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 1005 (2004) [hereinafter Drizin & Leo, The Problem
of False Confessions] (finding that juveniles’ “eagerness to comply with adult authority
figures, impulsivity, immature judgment, and inability to recognize and weigh risks in deci-
sion-making,” puts them at greater risk to confess falsely); Kassin et al., Police-Induced Con-
fessions, supra note 39, at 8 (“[Y]outh under age 15 . . . are more likely to believe that they R
should waive their rights and tell what they have done, partly because they are still young
enough to believe that they should never disobey authority.”).  Juveniles are more vulnerable
to suggestion during questioning than adults. See GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTER-
ROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at 381; K. Singh & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Inter- R
rogative Suggestibility Among Adolescents and Its Relationship with Intelligence, Memory,
and Cognitive Set, 15 J. ADOLESCENCE 155, 160 (1992).
82 See F. James Billings et al., Can Reinforcement Induce Children to Falsely Incrimi-
nate Themselves?, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 125, 126 (2007); Jessica R. Meyer & N. Dickon
Reppucci, Police Practices and Perceptions Regarding Juvenile Interrogation and Interroga-
tive Suggestibility, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 757, 764 (2007) [hereinafter Meyer & Reppucci,
Police Practices & Perceptions] (“Psychologically coercive strategies that contribute to inter-
rogative suggestibility play on young suspects’ eagerness to please, firm trust of people in
authority, lack of self-confidence, increased desire to protect friends/relatives and to impress
peers, and increased desire to leave the interrogation sooner.” (citations omitted)); G. Richard-
son et al., Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Forensic Population, 18 J. ADOLES-
CENCE 211, 215 (1995).
83 See Steinberg & Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence, supra note 50, at R
261; see also GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 158–59; Grisso et al., R
Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 67, at 357; Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note R
17, at 292 (“[J]uvenile offenders . . . are more susceptible than adult offenders to negative R
feedback from authority figures, because they demonstrate an increased tendency to change
their previous answers . . . .”).
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The Court requires suspects to invoke Miranda rights clearly and
unambiguously.84  However, some groups—juveniles, females, or racial
minorities—may speak indirectly or assert rights tentatively to avoid
conflict with those in power.85 Davis v. United States recognized that
requiring suspects to invoke rights clearly could prove problematic for
some.86  Even older youths who understand Miranda may feel more con-
strained, more susceptible to power differentials, and less able to volun-
tarily relinquish rights.87
II. MIRANDA AND INTERROGATION: THEN AND NOW
The Miranda Court had no direct evidence or empirical studies of
how police questioned suspects.88  It had no way to assess how psycho-
logical tactics like isolation, confrontation, and minimization affected a
suspect’s willingness to talk.89  The Court used training manuals as a
proxy for interrogation practices.90  The techniques recommended in In-
bau and Reid’s Criminal Interrogation and Confessions—the leading
manual at the time—provided a surrogate for actual practices.91  The
Reid Method remains the leading training program in the United States
and underlies most contemporary interrogation practice,92 and its ubiq-
84 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010); Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
85 See Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 318.
86 Davis, 512 U.S. at 460 (“[R]equiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might
disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a
variety of other reasons—will not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actu-
ally want to have a lawyer present.”).
87 FELD, KIDS, COPS, CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 58. R
88 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (“Interrogation still takes place in
privacy.  Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what
in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms.”).
89 Id. at 448 (“[T]he modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically
rather than physically oriented.”). See generally Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of Confession Evidence: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI.
PUB. INT. 33, 53–56 (2004).
90 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448–55; see also Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to
Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda,
84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 (1999); Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1519, 1526 (2008) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda]. See generally Charles
D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 119 n.48 (1998) [hereinafter Weis-
selberg, Saving Miranda] (describing the research conducted by the Supreme Court librarian to
determine the representativeness of interrogation manuals).
91 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449 n.9 (“The methods described in Inbau & Reid, Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions . . . have had rather extensive use among law enforcement agen-
cies . . . .”).
92 See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 111–12 (2008)
[ hereinafter LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE]. See generally Joseph D.
Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confes-
sions Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1465 (1999) (contrasting the interrogation tech-
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uity provides a research framework.93 Miranda noted that isolating a
suspect to eliminate psychological supports and using interrogation tac-
tics to overcome resistance creates the compulsive pressures of custodial
interrogation.94
A. Interrogation Tactics
Once police conclude a suspect is probably guilty, they build the
strongest case they can for the prosecution.  The police try to outsmart
the suspect, overcome his resistance, and elicit an incriminating state-
ment.95  After the suspect waives his or her rights, police may use the
same strategies they used prior to Miranda to obtain a confession.96
1. The Reid Method: Accusatory Interrogation
Social psychologists describe the Reid Method’s manipulations as
maximization and minimization techniques.97  Maximization tactics
“convey the interrogator’s rock-solid belief that the suspect is guilty and
that all denials will fail.  Such tactics include making an accusation,
overriding objections, and citing evidence, real or manufactured, to shift
niques taught in third edition of Inbau and Reid’s CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS with the demands of modern confession law).  Reid instructors have trained
more than 500,000 investigators, Interviewing & Interrogation, JOHN E. REID & ASSOCS.,
available at http://www.reid.com/training_programs/interview_overview.html (last visited
Oct. 4, 2013), and the Reid Method is the most widely taught interrogation technique in North
America.  Lesley King & Brent Snook, Peering Inside a Canadian Interrogation Room: An
Examination of the Reid Model of Interrogation, Influence Tactics, and Coercive Strategies,
36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 674, 674 (2009).
93 Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra note11, at 50–51; see R
e.g. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at R
10–21; King & Snook, supra note 92, at 675–80; Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation R
Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 293 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interroga-
tion Room].
94 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 449–55; see also GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERRO-
GATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at 10–20 (“[Inbau and Reid] introduced a nine-step R
method aimed at breaking down the resistance of reluctant suspects and making them confess,
referred to as the ‘Reid Technique’.”); id. at 30–31 (“Social isolation . . . can powerfully
influence the decision-making of suspects and the reliability of their statements.”); Kassin et
al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 15 (“[T]he goal of interrogation is to alter a R
suspect’s decision making by increasing the anxiety associated with denial and reducing the
anxiety associated with confession . . . .”); Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 222 (1997) [hereinafter Kassin, The Psychology of Confes-
sion Evidence] (“Against the backdrop of a physical environment that promotes feelings of
social isolation, sensory deprivation, and a lack of control, Inbau et al. . . . described in vivid
detail a nine-step procedure designed to overcome the resistance of reluctant suspects.”).
95 LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 23. R
96 See Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 224 R
(“[C]ommonly used [interrogation] techniques circumvent laws designed to prohibit the use of
coerced confessions.”).
97 See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 45 (discussing maximization and minimi- R
zation techniques used in police interrogations).
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the suspect’s mental statement from confident to hopeless.”98  Minimiza-
tion techniques “provide the suspect with moral justification and face-
saving excuses for having committed the crime in question.  Using this
approach, the interrogator offers sympathy and understanding; normal-
izes and minimizes the crime.”99  Psychologists contend that many Reid
techniques imply threats or promise leniency.100
The Reid Method claims that interrogators can use verbal and non-
verbal cues—behavioral symptom analysis—to distinguish between
guilty and innocent suspects and to question them accordingly.101  It
prescribes a nine-step sequence to increase stress, weaken resistance,
provide face-saving rationales, and encourage confessions.102  The Reid
Method does not modify interrogation tactics to accommodate develop-
mental differences between adolescents and adults.103  It teaches police
98 Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 12. R
99 Id. at 14.
100 See id. at 12 (“[I]t is particularly common for interrogators to communicate as a means
of inducement, implicitly or explicitly, a threat of harsher consequences in response to the
suspect’s denials.” (citation omitted)); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 43 (“[T]he R
sympathetic interrogator morally justifies the crime, leading the suspect to infer he or she will
be treated leniently and to see confession as the best possible means of ‘escape.’”).
101 See Meyer & Reppucci, Police Practices & Perceptions, supra note 82, at 760 R
(describing how Reid Method interrogation begins with a “Behavioral Analysis Interview,”
where police decide if an interviewee is a “prime suspect” by observing whether the inter-
viewee exhibits verbal and non-verbal deceptive behaviors such as “gaze aversion, unnatural
body postures,” “touching and scratching,” “lack of confidence, and delays in response”).
Psychologists question the theoretical underpinnings and scientific validity of the Reid
Method. See id. (“Unfortunately, . . . many of these verbal and non-verbal behaviors have
little discriminant function in the identification of liars versus truth-tellers.” (citation omitted));
see also GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note
80, at 12 (“Inbau and [Reid] have not published any data or studies on their observations.  In R
other words, they have not collected any empirical data to scientifically validate their theory
and techniques.”).
102 See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 212–16 (4th
ed. 2004); LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 119 R
(“[P]sychological interrogation . . . is a strategic, multistage, goal-directed, stress-driven exer-
cise in persuasion and deception, one designed to produce a very specific set of psychological
effects and reactions in order to move the suspect from denial to admission.”); see also
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at R
10–21 (presenting the bases of the Reid Method: “[b]reaking down denials and resistance” and
“[i]ncreasing the suspect’s desire to confess”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 452 (1987) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda] (arguing
that the tensions police create in the custodial environment are designed to overcome a sus-
pect’s reluctance to talk).
103 See Meyer & Reppucci, Police Practices & Perceptions, supra note 82, at 761; Owen- R
Kostelnik et al., supra note 17, at 290; N. Dickon Reppucci et al., Custodial Interrogation of R
Juveniles: Results of a National Survey of Police, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CON-
FESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 67, 69 (G. Daniel
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010).
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the interrogation “principles . . . discussed with respect to adult suspects
are just as applicable to the younger ones.”104
2. PACE and PEACE: Investigative Interview
Interrogations in the England and Wales are less accusatory and de-
signed to elicit information rather than to secure a confession.105  The
Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984) required police to re-
cord interrogations.106  The mnemonic PEACE—”Planning and Prepara-
tion,” “Engage and Explain,” “Account,” “Closure,” and “Evaluate”—
describes the five components of the British interview approach.107  Po-
lice, psychologists, and lawyers collaborated to develop a less confronta-
tional, information-gathering method of interviewing.108  Whereas Reid
104 INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 298.  Reid-trained police view adolescents to be as R
competent as adults and use similar tactics with both. See Meyer & Reppucci, Police Prac-
tices & Perceptions, supra note 82, at 761; see also Jessica O. Kostelnik & N. Dickon Rep- R
pucci, Reid Training and Sensitivity to Developmental Maturity in Interrogation: Results from
a National Survey of Police, 27 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 361, 370–74 (2009) [hereinafter Kostelnik
& Reppucci, Reid Training and Sensitivity] (reporting that Reid-trained officers are less sensi-
tive to developmental differences than are non-Reid trained officers and use with younger
offenders the same techniques used with adults: isolation, psychological manipulation, and
deceit).
105 See Ray Bull & Becky Milne, Attempts to Improve the Police Interviewing of Sus-
pects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 181, 185–86 (G. Daniel Lassiter
ed., 2004) [hereinafter Bull & Milne, Attempts to Improve the Police Interviewing of Suspects];
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 28. See generally MILNE & BULL, R
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10; Ray Bull & Stavroula Soukara, Four Studies of R
What Really Happens in Police Interviews, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFES-
SIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 81 (G. Daniel
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) [hereinafter Bull & Soukara, Four Studies].
106 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 60; see MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGA-
TIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 73–76; GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGA- R
TIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at 22 (“Since 1991 there has been mandatory tape- R
recording [in England and Wales] of any person suspected of an indictable offence who is
interviewed under caution.” (citation omitted)); Bull & Soukara, Four Studies, supra note 105, R
at 81–82.
107 MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 159.  The PEACE R
approach encourages officers to establish rapport, to obtain a free narrative, to use open rather
than leading questions, and then provide meaningful closure by summarizing information and
answering any questions. See id. at 157–67; Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra
note 39, at 28. R
108 See GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra
note 80, at 53; see also MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at R
157–67 (describing the goal of the interview as to gather as much information as possible to
create an accurate factual picture, rather than simply to elicit a confession).  PEACE tech-
niques differ substantially from the Reid Method.  Investigators conduct interviews as a search
for truth rather than a quest for a confession, and the approach prohibits the use of trickery.
See Bull & Soukara, Four Studies, supra note 105, at 81–83; S. Soukara et al., What Really R
Happens in Police Interviews of Suspects?  Tactics and Confessions, 15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L.
493, 500 (2009) [hereinafter Soukara et al., What Really Happens].
Advocates of the PEACE approach criticize Reid Method as “contrary to the principles of
good investigative interviewing.”  Bull & Milne, Attempts to Improve the Police Interviewing
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training equates juveniles and adults, PACE recognizes youths’ vulnera-
bilities and requires the presence of an “appropriate adult” at a juvenile’s
interview.109
Minnesota interrogation practices reflect both Reid and PEACE ele-
ments.  The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Scales, required police
to record custodial interviews,110 and police trainers developed less con-
frontational strategies to question suspects.111  Training protocols advo-
cate use of open-ended questions to obtain a free narrative and to elicit
information rather than to conduct the “recorded interview with the goal
of getting a confession.”112
B. Police Interrogation: Empirical Research
In the decades since Miranda, psychologists, criminologists, and le-
gal scholars have conducted remarkably few empirical studies of how
of Suspects, supra note 105, at 182.  Reid tactics seek to control and manipulate the suspect to R
extract a confession. See id.  The accusatorial approach is guilt-presumptive and confronta-
tional and attempts to elicit statements that confirm police hypotheses about the suspect’s guilt.
See id.  By contrast, the information-gathering method emphasizes rapport between the ques-
tioner and suspect and seeks the suspect’s version of events. See MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGA-
TIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 157–58; Bull & Soukara, Four Studies, supra note 105, R
at 84–87.  It uses open-ended questions to gather information, rather than simply to confirm a
pre-existing assumption. See MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at R
22–24; Bull & Soukara, Four Studies, supra note 105, at 84–87. R
109 See COLIN CLARKE & REBECCA MILNE, NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE PEACE IN-
VESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING COURSE 32 (2001); see also MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE IN-
TERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 77 (discussing youths’ vulnerabilities during police R
questioning); Ray Bull, The Investigative Interviewing of Children and Other Vulnerable Wit-
nesses: Psychological Research and Working/Professional Practice, 15 LEGAL & CRIMINO-
LOGICAL PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (2010) [hereinafter Bull, Investigative Interviewing of Children].
110 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
111 See NEIL NELSON, STRATEGIES FOR THE RECORDED INTERVIEW (2006) (on file with
author) (describing, as part of a police interrogation training program, various aspects of inter-
rogation and questioning).  “[T]he interview is used to gather information, not look for a con-
fession. . . .  Your goal is to remove the adversarial nature of the interview.” Id. at 17.
Minnesota trainers teach police to avoid minimization tactics because accusatorial tactics do
not play well on tape when reviewed by fact-finders. Id. at 11–12.  The purpose of the inter-
view is “[t]o gather information (not to get a confession) as part of a thorough and exhaustive
investigation.” Id. at 4.
112 Id. at 10.  Neutral, open-ended questions and a free narrative give the suspect an op-
portunity to provide information without putting her on the defensive.  The strategy empha-
sizes rapport with the suspect: “[be] friendly, receptive, non-adversarial.  Be polite and
respectful; doing so will help enforce the non-adversarial atmosphere and will demonstrate that
you expect politeness and respect in return.” Id. at 18.  The officer attempts to develop a
partnership with the suspect:
Set yourself up as the simple and impartial carrier of facts.  You are the vehicle
that takes the story to the higher power—the people who decide the suspect’s fate
(e.g., charging attorney, judge, jury). . . .  Say that you are not the person who de-
cides that the suspect’s story is unworthy.  Continually reinforce your role as partner
and messenger, rather than decision-maker.
Id. at 18–19.
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police question people.113  Research in the late-1960s evaluated whether
police warned suspects and how warnings affected their ability to obtain
confessions.114  However, only the 1967 Yale–New Haven study actually
observed police question suspects.115  In the mid-1990s, Richard Leo
conducted the only field study of interrogation in the United States.116
Criminologists and legal scholars have used indirect methods to study
tapes and transcripts of interrogation.117  Analyses of PACE recordings
113 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 4–5; Leo, R
Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 267–68 (“[W]e know scant more about actual R
police interrogation practices today than we did in 1966 when Justice Earl Warren lamented
the gap problem in Miranda v. Arizona.”). See generally Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 631 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, The
Impact of Miranda Revisited] (“[E]verything we know to date about the impact of Miranda
comes from research that was undertaken when Miranda was still in its infancy.”); Paul G.
Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the
Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 840 (1996) (decrying the dearth of knowledge
about police interrogations).
114 After Miranda, studies measured police compliance and the impact of warnings on
confession rates. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Imple-
mentation of Miranda, 47 DENV. L. J. 1, 11–34 (1970) (interviewing jailed suspects about their
knowledge and understanding of Miranda warnings); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Po-
lice Interrogation in Our Nation’s Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 1347, 1348–50 (1968); Richard H. Seeburger & R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in
Pittsburgh—A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1967) (“Miranda has not impaired
significantly the ability of the law enforcement agencies to apprehend and convict the crimi-
nal.”); James W. Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice: The Impact of Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320,
326–27 (1973) (suggesting Miranda warnings have a marginal impact on collateral functions
of interrogation, such as implicating accomplices).
Most researchers concluded that Miranda had a minimal effect on rates of confession and
conviction or on interrogation tactics. See, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Ef-
fect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 547
(1996) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect] (“Miranda’s empirically detectable
net damage to law enforcement is zero.”); George C. Thomas III, Is Miranda a Real-World
Failure?  A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821, 837
(1996) [hereinafter Thomas, Is Miranda a Real-World Failure?] (“[T]here is no proof of a
Miranda effect on the confession rate.”).  However, some insisted that Miranda adversely
affected police effectiveness. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical
Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 394, 417 (1996) [hereinafter Cassell, Miranda’s Social
Costs] (arguing Miranda’s costs include not just confessions suppressed because of Miranda
violations, but also “lost confessions,” i.e., statements not obtained because Miranda warnings
dissuade suspects from talking).
115 See Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76
YALE L.J. 1519, 1533–58, 1613 (1967) (observing police interrogation of suspects and con-
cluding “[n]ot much has changed after Miranda”).
116 In 1992–93, Richard Leo observed 122 interrogations at a major urban police depart-
ment and reviewed sixty videotaped interrogations performed by two other police departments.
Leo, Miranda’s Revenge, supra note 11, at 263; Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra R
note 93, at 268. R
117 See, e.g., FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 6 (analyzing 307 R
interrogation tapes and transcripts); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, at 851–52 (attending R
prosecutor charge screening sessions and interviewing police about interrogations); Feld,
Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra note 11, at 62–63 (analyzing 66 R
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in England have generated a substantial body of empirical research.118
Psychologists Saul Kassin, Gisli Gudjonsson, and associates have con-
ducted extensive laboratory research for decades, although these studies
lack the external validity of custodial interrogation.119  Studies of false
confessions provide another glimpse into how police interrogate suspects
and highlight the vulnerability of younger suspects.120
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Scales used its
supervisory power to regulate admissibility of evidence and required po-
tapes and transcripts of interrogation of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old felony delinquents in
one county in Minnesota); Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 11, at 248–49; R
King & Snook, supra note 92, at 674 (analyzing forty-four recorded criminal interrogations in R
Canada to assess the prevalence of Reid Method tactics); Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda,
supra note 90, at 1521; Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 90, at 134–40 (analyzing R
police training manuals).
118 See MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 75–76; see, e.g., R
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 80, at R
59–60, 79–80 (employing sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods to code and ana-
lyze tapes and transcripts of interrogations); ROGER EVANS, ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH JUVENILES (1993) [hereinafter EVANS,
THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS] (analyzing PACE transcripts of police interviews of
juveniles); Bull & Soukara, Four Studies, supra note 105, at 84–93 (analyzing audio tapes of R
interrogations to see whether interviewers employed the PEACE approach and which tactics
helped the interviewer obtain a confession); Roger Evans, Police Interrogations and the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice, 4 POLICING & SOC’Y: INT’L J. RES. & POL’Y 73, 79–80
(1994); John Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities: Predicting
the Likelihood of a Confession, 8 J. COMMUNITY & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1998) [herein-
after Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities].
119 See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 215, 218–21 (2005) [hereinafter Kassin, On the Psychol-
ogy of Confessions] (summarizing a number of his laboratory studies and simulations of police
interrogation); Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 16–17; Kassin, The R
Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 223 (describing “maximization” and R
“minimization” techniques); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 33. R
120 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROS-
ECUTIONS GO WRONG 279 (2011) [hereinafter GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT] (report-
ing false confessions in 16% of wrongful convictions); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CON-
VICTED (2000); Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81 at 902 (noting R
that false confessions occur in about 14–25% or more of cases of wrongful convictions and
DNA exonerations); Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 39, at 66, 89 (reporting that of 200 R
DNA exonorees, 11% were juveniles and many wrongful convictions contained false confes-
sions); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY, 523, 545 (2005) (analyzing 340 criminal exonerations between 1989
and 2003 and reporting that 42% of juveniles gave false confessions); Richard A. Leo &
Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequence of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscar-
riages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Integration, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 429,
429 (1998) (“[P]olice-induced false confession ranks amongst the most fateful of all official
errors.”).
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lice to record custodial interrogations.121 Scales held that “all custodial
interrogation including any information about rights, any waiver of those
rights, and all questioning shall be electronically recorded where feasible
and must be recorded when questioning occurs at a place of deten-
tion.”122  Nearly two decades later, just over a dozen states require police
to record interrogations.123
This study analyzes Scales tapes and transcripts, police reports,
juvenile court petitions, and sentences associated with the felo-
ny offense for which police interrogated youth.  Delinquency trials
of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths charged with felony offen-
ses are public proceedings.124  County attorneys in Minnesota’s
four largest counties allowed me to search their closed files of
sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths charged with a felony125 and
121 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994).
122 Id.  The Minnesota court in Scales adopted the reasoning of the Alaska Supreme Court
in State v. Stephan, 711 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Alaska 1985):
A recording requirement . . . provides a more accurate record of a defendant’s
interrogation and thus will reduce the number of disputes over the validity of Mi-
randa warnings and the voluntariness of purported waivers.  In addition, an accurate
record makes it possible for a defendant to challenge misleading or false testimony
and, at the same time, protects the state against meritless claims.  Recognizing that
the trial and appellant [sic] courts consistently credit the recollections of police of-
ficers regarding the events that take place in an unrecorded interview, the [Stephan]
court held that recording “is now a reasonable and necessary safeguard . . . .”  A
recording requirement also discourages unfair and psychologically coercive police
tactics and thus results in more professional law enforcement.
Id. at 591 (citation omitted).
123 See Thomas P. Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, in POLICE INTERROGA-
TIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS, CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 127, 127–28 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) [hereinafter
Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings]; see, e.g., In re Jerrell C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110,
123 (Wis. 2005); see also GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 120, at 341 n.23 R
(listing statutes and regulations that require recording of interrogations); THOMAS P. SULLIVAN,
NW. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RE-
CORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS app. A1–A10 (2004) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, POLICE
EXPERIENCES]  (listing police departments that record custodial interrogations); Allison D.
Redlich & Steven Drizin, Police Interrogation of Youth, in THE MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF
YOUNG OFFENDERS 49, 73 (Carol L. Kessler & Louis James Kraus eds., 2007) [hereinafter
Redlich & Drizin, Police Interrogation of Youth]; Thomas P. Sullivan, The Time Has Come for
Law Enforcement Recordings of Custodial Interviews, Start to Finish, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 175, 176 (2006) [hereinafter Sullivan, The Time Has Come].
124 MINN. STAT. § 260B.163(1)(c)(2) (2005).  At the request of the County Attorneys, this
study focused on older felony delinquents to obviate some privacy concerns.  However, many
files included information about younger juveniles—e.g., co-offenders—whose identity re-
mained confidential.
125 Police conducted most of the interrogations in this study between about 2003 and
2006.  Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, and Ramsey Counties are the four most populous of Minne-
sota’s 87 counties and account for almost half (47.6%) the state’s population and nearly half
(45.6%) the delinquency petitions filed. See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note
12, at 272, for a more complete description of the methodology and data summarized here. R
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to copy those in which police interrogated or juveniles invoked Mir-
anda.126
I analyzed 307 files of juveniles charged with felonies that invoked
or waived Miranda.  I reviewed police reports and other documents to
learn about the crime, the context of interrogation, and evidence police
possessed when they questioned a suspect.  I coded each file to analyze
where, when, and who was present at an interrogation, how police ad-
ministered Miranda, whether juveniles invoked or waived, how officers
interrogated them, how they responded, and how invoking Miranda af-
fected case processing.127  The 307 files reflect some sample selection
bias because they are charged cases, serious delinquents, more likely to
go to trial, and perhaps include more juveniles who waived Miranda.128
Despite these caveats, the study includes a range of serious crimes and
analyzes the largest number of routine felony interrogations ever aggre-
gated in the United States.129  More than 150 officers from more than
126 The court orders authorized access to juvenile courts’ files and included confidential-
ity stipulations to protect juveniles’ identity.  The orders provided:
Prof. Barry C. Feld shall retain personal custody of all edited files and no one
else shall have access to those files.  He shall personally transcribe all tapes not
already transcribed and report his research findings only in ways that preserve the
confidentiality of the information contained therein.
Order In re Request of Professor Barry C. Feld to Access Ramsey County Attorney’s Juvenile
Delinquency Felony Files (June 1, 2004) (on file with author). I personally transcribed interro-
gation tapes and coded all of the files to address confidentiality concerns.  Confidentiality
restrictions precluded use of multiple coders and inter-rater reliability scores.
127 I obtained, modified, and expanded codebooks used in prior interrogation research.
E.g., Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93; John Pearse & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, R
The Identification and Measurement of “Oppressive” Police Interviewing Tactics in Britain, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK 75 (2003); Wald et
al., supra note 115. R
128 The sample includes only juveniles whom prosecutors charged with a felony and for
whom an interrogation or invocation record exists.  Other evidence being equal, prosecutors
are more likely to charge suspects who waive than those who invoke Miranda because they
have plea bargain advantage.  Police made these Scales recordings during custodial interroga-
tion, and the files do not include unrecorded, non-custodial interviews.  The felony cases in
which prosecutors charged that contained transcripts may differ in some ways from those in
which juveniles invoked Miranda or which police did not forward for charging, those cases
that prosecutors did not charge, or those that they charged but which did not contain tran-
scripts.  Minnesota excludes cases of sixteen- or seventeen-year old youths charged with Mur-
der 1 from juvenile court jurisdiction, Minn. Stat. 260B.007(6)(B) (2011); see also Barry C.
Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
MINN. L. REV. 965, 1051–57 (1995), and prosecutors filed transfer motions against some other
youths charged with the most serious offenses.  Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacz & Barry C.
Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 449, 462–468 (1996) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, The End of the Line].  As a result,
the sample under-represents some of the most serious crimes: murder, criminal sexual conduct
and armed offenses.
129 See generally Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-
Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 397 (2007)
[hereinafter Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation] (“In an era of electronic re-
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fifty agencies interviewed these suspects.130  I interviewed police, prose-
cutors, defense lawyers, and juvenile court judges to elicit their views,
learn from their experience, and validate my findings.131
IV. REAL INTERROGATION
These analyses focus on three aspects of routine felony interroga-
tion.  After describing characteristics of the youths in this study, I ex-
amine youths who invoked or waived Miranda.  I analyze how police
questioned the vast majority of youths who waived.  Finally, I focus on
how long police questioned them and the outcomes of interrogations.
A. Characteristics of Juveniles Whom Police Interrogated
As Table 1 indicates, males comprised the vast majority (89.3%) of
the 307 youths whom police questioned.  Prosecutors charged more than
half (55.0%) with felony property offenses—burglary, larceny, and auto-
theft.  They charged nearly one-third (31.6%) the youths with crimes
against the person—murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and
criminal sexual conduct.  They charged the remaining youths with drug
crimes (6.2%), firearm offenses (5.5%), and other felonies (1.6%).
cording, the ideal way for scholars to measure and study actual police practices and their
outcomes . . . is to observe large numbers of videotaped interrogations . . . involving a full
range of crimes.”).
130 The variability of interrogation strategies reflect officers’ training and experience, on-
the-job learning, and personal styles rather than scientifically evaluated techniques. See Rich-
ard A. Leo, The Third Degree and the Origins of Psychological Interrogation in the United
States, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND ENTRAPMENT 37 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004);
Allison D. Redlich & Christian A. Meissner, Techniques and Controversies in the Interroga-
tion of Suspects: The Artful Practice Versus Scientific Study, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN
THE COURTROOM: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 124 (Jennifer L. Skeem et al. eds., 2009).
We do not know how community contexts, police department cultures, or interrogation prac-
tices vary or how those variations affect suspects’ waivers or invocations. See EVANS, THE
CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS, supra note 118, at 21–22.  Police likely adjusted their inter- R
rogation tactics to accommodate Scales’ recording requirement. See, e.g., NELSON, supra note
111, at 11–12 (“Before Scales, minimizing was a standard technique, part of your work prod- R
uct; cops used it as a tactic to get bad guys to confess; since Scales, a defense attorney can
attack every misleading thing you say to the suspect because it has been recorded.”).
131 I interviewed nineteen police officers, six juvenile prosecutors, nine juvenile defense
lawyers, and five juvenile court judges from both urban and suburban counties.  The police
officers averaged 18.4 years of professional experience; the prosecutors averaged 14.5 years;
the public defenders averaged 13.3 years; and the juvenile court judges, 16 years.  I inter-
viewed sergeants, detectives or investigators, and school resource officers, of the ranks and
specialties that conduct most custodial interrogations of juveniles.  The recorded interviews
lasted between 30 and 80 minutes, averaged about 45 minutes, and provided thick descriptions
of the process.  I conducted saturation interviews until no new data, themes, or conceptual
relationships emerged.  See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 280–81, R
for a more complete description of the methodology.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILES INTERROGATED
N %
Gender
Male 274 89.3
Female 33 10.7
Age
16 171 55.7
17 132 43.0
18 4 1.3
Race
White 160 52.1
Black 107 34.9
Asian 17 5.5
Hispanic 15 4.9
Native American 5 1.6
Offense
Property1 169 55.0
Person2 97 31.6
Drugs3 19 6.2
Firearms4 17 5.5
Other5 5 1.6
Prior Arrests
None 94 30.6
Status 47 15.3
Misdemeanor 70 22.8
One Felony 43 14.0
Two or More Felonies 37 21.1
Prior Juvenile Court Referrals
None 126 43.0
One or More 167 57.0
Court Status at Time of Interrogation
None 142 46.3
Prior Supervision 61 19.9
Current Probation/
Parole 75 24.4
Current Placement 17 5.5
1Crimes against property include: burglary, theft of a motor vehicle, arson, receiving stolen
property, possession of stolen property, possession of burglary tools, criminal damage to prop-
erty, theft, forgery, theft by swindle, and credit card fraud.
2Crimes against the person include: aggravated and simple robbery, aggravated assault, murder
and attempted murder, criminal vehicular homicide, criminal sexual conduct, and terroristic
threats.
3Drug crimes include: sale or possession of a controlled substance—crack, methamphetamine,
marijuana, codeine, ecstasy, heroin—possession of a forged prescription, and tampering with
anhydrous ammonia equipment (methamphetamine).
4Firearm crimes include: possession of a firearm, discharge of a firearm, theft of a firearm,
possession of an explosive device, and drive-by shooting.
5Other offenses include fleeing from a police officer.
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Nearly one-third (30.6%) of the juveniles had no prior arrests.  Po-
lice previously had arrested more than one-third for status offenses
(15.3%) or misdemeanors (22.8%).  About one-third of these youths
(35.1%) had one or more prior felony arrests.  More than half (57%) of
these youths had prior juvenile court referrals.  Nearly one-third (29.9%)
were under juvenile court supervision—probation, placement, or parole
status—when police questioned them.  About half of the youths were
white (52.1%) and the remainder (47.9%) members of ethnic and racial
minority groups—Black, Hispanic, Native American, and Asian.  Black
juveniles accounted for more than one-third (34.9%) of the sample.
Compared with the counties’ sixteen- and seventeen-year-old felony
caseloads, this group included more males and youths charged with prop-
erty and violent crimes, fewer charged with drug offenses, and more with
prior court referrals.132
B. To Waive or Not to Waive: That is the Question
When police take suspects into custody and interrogate them, Mi-
randa requires police to warn them to dispel the inherent coercion of
custodial questioning.133  Police had formally arrested the vast majority
(86.6%) of these juveniles prior to questioning, and made a Scales re-
cording of all of these interviews.134  Police detained nearly two-thirds
(61.7%) of the youths whom they questioned and released the others to
their parents.135  More than half (55.7%) of interrogations took place in
police stations and another quarter (23.1%) at juvenile detention cen-
ters.136  Thus, police questioned more than three-quarters (78.8%) of
youths in interrogation rooms.137  Nearly one-tenth (8.1%) of interroga-
tions took place in a police car at the place of arrest and the others in
juveniles’ homes (6.2%) or schools (6.2%).138
132 I compared characteristics of these interrogated youths with older youths charged with
felonies in the counties.  Barry C. Feld & Shelly Schaefer, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court: Law Reform to Deliver Legal Services and Reduce Justice by Geography, 9 CRIMINOL-
OGY & PUB. POL’Y 327, 340–42 (2010); Barry C. Feld & Shelly Schaefer, The Right to Coun-
sel in Juvenile Court: The Conundrum of Attorneys as an Aggravating Factor at Disposition,
27 JUST. Q. 713, 726 (2010).
133 Miranda assumed that the coercive pressures of interrogation arose when a person was
in custody, “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” and questioned.  Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300
(1980) (defining interrogation).
134 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 62. R
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
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1. Miranda Framework: Custody + Interrogation = Warning
Decades of court-approved formulae have reduced Miranda to a lit-
any that officers read from a card or waiver form.139  Researchers report
many versions of Miranda whose length and complexity vary considera-
bly.140  Although some jurisdictions use a juvenile Miranda warning,
paradoxically these may be more complex than adult versions.141  Every
juvenile in this study received a proper Miranda warning and one-fifth
(19.5%) of the files contained an initialed and signed warning form.
Although Miranda requires police to warn suspects, officers have
no incentive to encourage them to invoke their rights.  One of Miranda’s
root contradictions is that “it assumes that these suspects can receive ade-
quate advice and counseling about their constitutional rights from adver-
saries who would like nothing more than to see those rights
surrendered.”142  This inherent contradiction requires officers to engage
in a quasi-confidence game—“systematic use of deception, manipula-
tion, and the betrayal of trust in the process of eliciting a suspect’s
confession.”143
Police used several tactics to predispose suspects to waive Miranda
without alerting them to its significance or consequences—admonishing
her to tell the truth, minimizing the warning, or telling the suspect that it
is “his only opportunity to tell his side of the story.”144  An interrogator
must establish rapport, develop trust, and maintain a positive relationship
to obtain a waiver.145  The initial stages of an interrogation often provide
139 The Court has disavowed any rigid Miranda formulation as long as a warning conveys
the substance of the suspect’s rights.  Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1988).
140 Although warnings necessarily convey the basic constitutional information, one sur-
vey of 560 Miranda warnings reported 532 unique wordings.  Rogers et al., An Analysis of
Miranda Warnings, supra note 63.  A second survey of 385 warnings reported 356 unique R
versions.  Rogers et al., The Language of Miranda Warnings, supra note 64, at 126; see also R
Rogers, A Little Knowledge, supra note 72, at 778–79 (examining variation in length and R
reading level of Miranda warnings).
141 See Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 64, at 71 (reporting that R
warnings are longer and require higher level of reading ability).  Even “dumbed-down” ver-
sions of Miranda are “problematic for younger adolescents, ages 13 to 15, who lack sufficient
reading comprehension.”  Rogers et al., Comprehensibility and Content, supra note 64, at 72. R
Vocabulary and concepts make it more difficult for youth to understand an oral warning than a
written one. See Rogers, A Little Knowledge, supra note 72, at 780. R
142 Patrick A. Malone, “You Have the Right to Remain Silent”: Miranda After Twenty
Years, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 75, 84–85 (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998).
143 Leo, Miranda’s Revenge, supra note 11, at 261.  Leo compared an officer eliciting a R
Miranda waiver and confession to a confidence man manipulating his victim “through false
representations, artifice, and subterfuge.” Id. at 265.
144 Id. at 272.
145 INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 91. R
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an opportunity to soften-up a suspect and allay his fears.146  The Court in
Pennsylvania v. Muniz allowed police to ask booking questions before
they warn,147 and these conversations may predispose suspects to
waive.148  In about half of the cases (52.8%), police gave the Miranda
warning immediately after identifying the suspect.149  In the other half of
cases (47.2%), police first asked booking questions—name, age and date
of birth, address and telephone number, grade in school, and the like—
and sometimes used juveniles’ responses to engage in casual conversa-
tions, to put youths at ease, and to accustom them to answering
questions.150
2. Negotiating Miranda Warnings
Police can comply with Miranda and predispose suspects to
waive.151  They may nod while reading the warning to cue the suspect to
agree or tell the person that the interview provides his only opportunity
to tell his story.152  They may warn in a way that obscures their adver-
sarial relationship with the suspect.153  Training manuals instruct police
to blend the warning into the conversation, to describe it as a formality,
146 In discussing the role of the interrogator, Leo notes, “They must first establish a rap-
port with him.  The interrogator asks background questions, engages in small talk, and may
even flatter or ingratiate the suspect to create the illusion of a nonthreatening, non-adversarial
encounter.” LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 26. R
147 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (recognizing a “booking excep-
tion” to Miranda); id. at 608 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the result in part) (finding that a
suspect’s responses to booking questions were not testimonial); see also Rhode Island v. Innis
446 U.S. 291, 301 (holding that police only need give warnings before taking “words or ac-
tions . . . [they] should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”).
148 See Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 113, at 661 (“[T]he detective R
. . . makes pleasant small talk with the suspect . . . as he goes through the routine booking
questions . . . to disarm the suspect, to lower his anxiety levels, to improve his opinion of the
detective and to create a social psychological setting conducive both to a Miranda waiver as
well as to subsequent admissions.”); Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1562; R
see also LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 122; Robert R
P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of
an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1239,
1258–59 (2007) (describing the difficulty courts have ruling on deceptive police conduct that
occurs after Miranda warnings have been given but before suspects have clearly waived their
rights).
149 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 77. R
150 Id. at 77–78.  For example, a question about a youth’s grade in school might lead to a
side conversation about favorite subjects, academic progress, or the like.
151 LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 126–30; R
Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1548 (“Officers sometimes use ‘softening R
up’ tactics—such as conditioning suspects to waive their rights or describing the evidence
against them and making their situation appear hopeless—before giving warnings or obtaining
waivers.”).
152 Redlich & Drizin, Police Interrogation of Youth, supra note 123, at 65. R
153 Leo & White, supra note 90, at 432; see also WELSH S. WHITE, Miranda’s Waning R
Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson 81–82 (2003) [hereinafter WHITE,
Miranda’s Waning Protections].
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or to summarize the evidence, which a suspect can explain only if he
waives.154 Dickerson v. United States noted that Miranda is “embedded
in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture.”155  Officers regularly refer to suspects’ fa-
miliarity with Miranda from television and movies.156 Miranda’s cul-
tural ubiquity may detract from youths’ distinguishing its protections
from background noise or meaningless ritual.157
Police conveyed to juveniles the value of talking—“telling their
story” and “telling the truth”—before they gave a warning.158  They
characterized it as an administrative formality to complete before the sus-
pect can talk.159  They sometimes referred to it as “paperwork” to em-
phasize its bureaucratic quality.160  A waiver form provides a vehicle to
convert Miranda into a bureaucratic exercise.161  Officers sometimes
preceded the warning with a recital of evidence against a youth, which
created a pressure to waive and explain it.162
154 See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1562. R
155 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000); see Leo & White, supra note 90, at 434–35 (“Interrogators R
may also de-emphasize the significance of the Miranda warnings by referring to their dissemi-
nation in popular American television shows and cinema, perhaps joking that the suspect is
already well aware of his rights and probably can recite them from memory.”); see also Bald-
win, supra note 1, at 337 (“The [English and Welsh] police caution (like, say, the wording of R
an oath in court or the Lord’s Prayer) can easily take on the form of an empty ritual or an
unthinking recitation.”).
156 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 81 (“‘I’ll read it out loud to ya R
and then I’ll let you read it through if you want.  It’s a Warning and Consent to Speak.  Basi-
cally you’ve heard the Miranda warning on Cops and TV and stuff.  I’m gonna read you your
rights like you see on TV.’”).
157 See Naomi E. Sevin Goldstein et al., Juvenile Offenders’ Miranda Rights Comprehen-
sion and Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering False Confessions, 10 ASSESSMENT 359, 366
(2003) (“[D]espite increased exposure to the Miranda warnings from depictions in television
and movies, juvenile offenders today understand their rights in much the same way adolescents
did generations ago.”).
158 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 80.  One officer prefaced the R
advisory by saying:
“I just started investigating yesterday, and what I’ve learned over the years is
there’s always two sides to every story and this is your opportunity to give your side
of the story.  Under law, I have to advise you of your Miranda, your legal rights, per
Miranda, and I’ll read those now.”
Id.
159 Id. (“‘Okay, due to the fact that you are in custody, I have to advise you of your
Miranda rights before I do any questioning.  I do want you to listen to these rights, because
these are your rights.’”).
160 Id. (“‘We can go through a little bit of paperwork.  Let me explain a few things to you,
and then if you want to, you can sign right there.’”)
161 Id. at 81 (“‘I need you to initial down the side and when I’m all done reading ‘em to
ya, sign your full name at the bottom.  And that’s just for your rights.  That’s just all this
covers right here is your Miranda advisory, okay?’”).
162 Id. at 81–82.  In one interview, the officer prefaced Miranda with some circumstantial
evidence:
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3. Waive or Invoke Miranda
After police warn a suspect, she may either waive or invoke their
rights.  The Supreme Court requires suspects to unambiguously invoke
their rights to silence and to counsel.163  Police establish that juveniles
understand their rights by reading the warning and then eliciting an af-
firmative response.164  After officers have read the rights to a youth, they
asked, “Do you understand that?”  Juveniles acknowledged the warnings
on the record—the Scales tape—and, in some departments, signed a Mi-
randa form.  Every juvenile claimed to understand Miranda, and those
who waived indicated a willingness to do so.
Despite youths’ apparent understanding, researchers question
whether juveniles grasp the warning.165  Juveniles lack adults’ compe-
tence to understand and appreciate important legal terms.166  Their ap-
pearances of comprehension—a claim to understand, a failure to
question, or absence of signs of confusion—may reflect compliance with
[“]Let me just explain a few things to you, okay?  The CDs you had, the victim
identified them as stolen.  My partner just went down to the underground garage
where the car was broken into.  Your shoe prints matched exactly with the prints on
the ground.  I have a witness that saw you in the underground garage, okay? . . .  My
whole thing is obviously, you’re in possession of stolen property.  I wanna know the
whole story.  If you know some stuff, that’s what I wanna know.  I want the truth,
that’s what I want.  Let me read something to you real quick, okay?[”]  [Officer
reads Miranda warning]
Id.
163 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (right to counsel); Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010) (right to silence); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 723–24 (1979) (finding that a juvenile’s request to speak with his probation officer
was not an invocation).
164 See WHITE, Miranda’s Waning Protections, supra note 153, at 81 (“[T]he government R
can establish a valid Miranda waiver by simply demonstrating that the suspect understood the
meaning of the Miranda warnings; it need not show that he understood the consequences of
waiving . . . .”).
165 GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 38; supra notes 67–78 and R
accompanying text; see also Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra
note 22, at 1166; Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 67, at 356. R
166 See, e.g., Regina M. Huerter & Bonnie E. Saltzman, What Do “They” Think?  The
Delinquency Court Process in Colorado as Viewed by the Youth, 69 DENV. U. L. REV. 345,
353 (1992) (reporting that, of the juvenile defendants interviewed, only half understood their
court proceedings); Karen Saywitz et al., Children’s Knowledge of Legal Terminology, 14
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 523 (1990) (showing that children often mishear legal terms and do not
know the terms’ definitions); Trudie Smith, Law Talk: Juveniles’ Understanding of Legal Lan-
guage, 13 J. CRIM. JUST. 339 (1985) (“[J]uveniles’ grasp of certain legal words and phrases
suggests that . . . their understanding of legal language is moderate and is confined to procedu-
ral terms.  They do not understand technical terms.”); Rogers, A Little Knowledge, supra note
72, at 779 (“In 45.1% of the jurisdictions, younger juvenile offenders . . . could not be ex- R
pected to have adequate comprehension of [Miranda] Component 4 [the right to free counsel]
even if they read above their expected grade levels.”); see also supra notes 64–78 and accom- R
panying text.
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authority or passive acquiescence.167  However, judges rely on objective
indicators—Scales tapes, signed forms, and police testimony—rather
than clinical assessments of subjective understanding to evaluate
juveniles’ waivers.
a) Waiving Miranda
Although Berghuis v. Thompkins approved implied waivers,168 po-
lice in this study consistently obtained express waivers.169  After they
asked juveniles whether they understood the warning, they concluded the
waiver process, “Bearing in mind that I’m a police officer and I’ve just
read your rights, are you willing to talk to me about this matter?”170
Another version of the waiver formula ended, “Having these rights in
mind, do you wish to talk to us now?”171
Miranda reasoned that police must warn a suspect to dispel the in-
herent coercion of custodial interrogation.172  Justice White’s Miranda
dissent asked why those same compulsive pressures do not coerce a
waiver as readily as an unwarned statement.173  Research confirms
White’s intuition that, after police isolate suspects in a police-dominated
environment, a warning cannot adequately empower them.174  Post-Mi-
randa studies reported that most suspects waived and confessed.  The
Yale–New Haven study concluded, “[W]arnings had little impact on sus-
167 Bull, Investigative Interviewing of Children, supra note 109, at 17 (“Vulnerable wit- R
nesses can spend much of their lives trying to appear competent and, therefore, may be espe-
cially unwilling to admit ‘I don’t know’ . . . .” (citation omitted)); Rogers, A Little Knowledge,
supra note 72, at 781 (arguing that suspects may pretend to understand Miranda warnings to R
avoid appearing ignorant).
168 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); see also Weisselberg, Mourn-
ing Miranda, supra note 90, 1582 nn.356–57 (listing decisions upholding admission of state- R
ments based on implied Miranda waivers in every federal court and appellate courts in forty-
two states and the District of Columbia, all predating Berghuis).
169 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 93; see supra Table 2. R
170 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 93. R
171 Id.
172 384 U.S. 436, 458, 476–77 (1966).
173 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White J., dissenting) (“The Court
apparently realizes its dilemma of foreclosing questioning without the necessary warnings but
at the same time permitting the accused, sitting in the same chair in front of the same police-
men, to waive his right to consult an attorney.”).
174 See Godsey, supra note 7, at 528–29 (observing how continued questioning can lead a R
suspect to “feel harassed” and how, even after a Miranda warning has been given and under-
stood, an interviewer may impose penalties on suspects to “provoke speech or punish si-
lence”); Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against
Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 119–20 (1997) [hereinafter
White, False Confessions and the Constitution] (“[E]ven when a suspect has nothing to con-
ceal, he may experience anxiety because of the dynamics of the interrogation process.”); see
also Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1537–38 (“[I]nterrogation . . . works R
by increasing suspects’ anxiety, instilling a feeling of hopelessness, and distorting suspects’
perceptions of their choices by leading them to believe that they will benefit by making a
statement.”).
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pects’ behavior.”175  Leo reported that more than three-quarters (78%) of
suspects waived their rights.176  Observers of police–prosecutor charging
conferences reported that 83.7% of adult suspects waived.177  A survey
of police estimated that 81% of adult suspects waived.178  Research in
England reported that half to two-thirds of people whom police ques-
tioned confessed, a more stringent outcome measure than simply
waiving.179
Juveniles waive Miranda at higher rates than do adults—around
90%.180  Juveniles’ higher waiver rates may reflect lack of understand-
ing, inability to invoke effectively, or less experience or prior involve-
ment with the justice system.181  Table 2 reports that the vast majority of
youths (92.8%) waived Miranda.182  Interviews with justice system per-
sonnel confirmed the validity of this finding—nearly all delinquents
waived Miranda.183
People waive and talk for a variety of reasons.  From childhood on,
parents teach their children to tell the truth—a social duty and a value in
itself.  The compulsion inherent in the interrogation room amplifies so-
cial pressure to speak when spoken to and to defer to authority.  Justice
personnel suggested that juveniles waived to avoid appearing guilty, to
175 Wald et al., supra note 115, at 1563. R
176 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 276. R
177 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, at 859. R
178 Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation, supra note 129, at 389. R
179 Pearse et al., Police Interviewing and Psychological Vulnerabilities, supra note 118, at R
1–2 (reporting confession rates of 55–62% in several studies).
180 See GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE Miranda, supra note
65, at 50 (stating that studies conducted in the 1970’s found rates of waiver by juveniles to be R
over 90% and a study in 2005 found the rate of waiver to be 87%); GRISSO, JUVENILES’
WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 36 (reporting that juveniles refused to talk during inter- R
rogations at a “considerably smaller” rate than adults); Grisso & Pomiciter, Interrogation of
Juveniles, supra note 67, at 333–34 (finding 90.6% of juvenile felony suspects chose to talk R
when interrogated); Viljoen et al., Legal Decisions of Preadolescent and Adolescent Defend-
ants, supra note 73, at 261 (reporting that, in a retrospective study of delinquents held in R
detention, 13.15% reported they had asserted their right to silence).
181 See Viljoen & Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights, supra note 70, at R
736–37.
182 Because this sample represents youths whom police questioned and prosecutors
charged, the waiver rate may be inflated somewhat.  Some justice system personnel suggested
that prosecutors are more likely to charge suspects who waived than those who invoked.
183 When asked how many juveniles waived Miranda, one officer said, “Almost all of
them.  I couldn’t even tell you the last time a kid told me he didn’t want to talk.” FELD, KIDS,
COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 95.  Another estimated 90% talk: “[N]ot very many R
kids that don’t talk to you.” Id.  Another police officer said, “I haven’t had very many not
speak to me.  I would have to say 95% of them or more talk.” Id.  A second confirmed, “I’d
say better than 95%.” Id.  And a third said, “Vast majority.  I’d say high 90s.” Id.  A suburban
prosecutor observed, “We don’t have very sophisticated criminals.  Maybe 10% refuse to
talk.” Id.  Almost all personnel thought that 90% or more of youths waived Miranda, and
none estimated that fewer than 80% waived. Id.
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tell their story, or to minimize responsibility.184  Some thought they
waived because they did not expect severe sanctions or believed that they
could mitigate negative consequences.185  Others ascribed waivers to na-
ı¨ve trust and lack of sophistication.186  Others attributed waivers to a de-
sire to escape the interrogation room—the compulsive pressures
Miranda purported to dispel.
b) Invoking Miranda
Fare v. Michael C. cited the defendant’s prior experience with po-
lice to find a valid waiver.187  Criminologists report a relationship be-
tween prior arrests and Miranda invocations.188  Post-Miranda research
reported that defendants with prior arrests gave fewer confessions than
did those with less experience.189  About one-third (35.1%) of the
184 One officer said, “They want to look cooperative.  If they didn’t do it, why would they
invoke?  Even those who’ve been in prison think they’re going to outsmart us.” Id.  Another
officer explained, “Kids always talk.  Whether they think they can outtalk you or outsmart you,
most of them realize, they got to talk.” Id. at 95–96.  Another officer said, “Some kids just
can’t wait to tell you exactly their side of the story.  They’re used to telling teachers and
parents their side of the story, and they want their side heard.” Id. at 96.  A prosecutor con-
curred that juveniles waive “because it’s their opportunity to either admit and mitigate any of
the negative outcomes they see will happen, or to spin the story in a way that makes it appear
that their role is less culpable.” Id.
185 Id. As one officer observed:
“Most kids are generally honest, especially the ones that are new to the system.
Most of them understand that they’re not going to get thrown away for life.  If they
confess they took the car, they’re going to be on probation.  I think most of them
understand that.  They want to tell you, get it done, get it over with, and move on.”
Id.
186 A public defender explained:
“They’re much more likely to talk because they think, ‘I can get out of my situation
if I just explain and I’m truthful.  I’m going to get some help.  They’re not going to
prosecute me.  This is what my parents want me to do.’  I mean their mind-set is
much more trusting of adults, so they’re not as aware of the sense of danger from
talking.”
Id.
187 442 U.S. 707, 726 (1979); see also GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra
note 42, at 64 (“[A] juvenile’s . . . extensive prior experience has sometimes been cited by R
judges as suggesting greater understanding of Miranda warnings due to more frequent expo-
sure to them and familiarity with court processes.”).
188 See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 286 (“[A] suspect with a R
felony record . . . was almost four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect
with no prior record and almost three times as likely to invoke as a suspect with a misde-
meanor record.”).
189 See, e.g., Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions, supra note 119, at 218 R
(“[I]individuals who have no prior felony record are more likely to waive their rights than are
those with a history of criminal justice ‘experience’.”); Leiken, supra note 114, at 21 tbl.4 R
(reporting that defendants with more prior arrests and felony convictions gave fewer confes-
sions than did defendants with fewer arrests or convictions).  Research on juveniles is consis-
tent. GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS, supra note 42, at 37 (reporting that juveniles’ R
rate of refusal to talk increased with the number of prior felony referrals they had
experienced).
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TABLE 2
JUVENILES WHO WAIVE OR INVOKE BY OFFENSE
Offense Total Waive Invoke
N % N % N %
Person 97 31.6 92 94.8 5 5.2
Property 169 55.0 157 92.9 12 7.1
Drugs 19 6.2 16 84.2 3 15.8
Firearm 17 5.5 15 88.2 2 11.8
Other 5 1.6 5 100 0 0
Total 307 100 285 92.8 22 7.2
JUVENILES WHO WAIVE OR INVOKE BY PRIOR RECORD*
Prior Arrests Total Waive Invoke
N % N % N %
Non-Felony 216 72 205 94.9 11 5.1
One or More Felony 84 28 73 86.9 11 13.1
Total 3001 100 278 92.7 22 7.3
**Statistically Significant at: c2(1, N = 300) = 5.7, p < .05
1Seven juveniles (2.3%) initially waived their Miranda rights and subsequently invoked them
during interrogation, at which point interrogation ceased. Because they were truncated interro-
gation, I exclude them from analyses of police interrogation tactics.
juveniles whose interrogations I studied had one or more felony arrests at
the time of questioning.190  Table 2 reports that juveniles with one or
more prior felony arrests waived their rights at significantly lower rates
(86.9%) than did those with fewer or less serious police contacts
(94.9%).
Several factors likely contribute to more invocations by those with
more extensive contacts.  Youths who waived at prior interrogations may
have learned that confessing redounds to their disadvantage.  Spending
time with lawyers enhances youths’ understandings of their rights, and
prior arrests also give them opportunities to learn about rights and legal
proceedings.191  Youths questioned previously may have learned to resist
the pressures of interrogation.  Prior felony arrests are a reasonable proxy
for understanding how to navigate the justice system.192  Prior arrests
provide opportunities to hear the Miranda warning, experience interroga-
190 Supra Table 1.
191 See Viljoen & Roesch, Competence to Waive Interrogation Rights, supra note 70, at R
737 (finding that juveniles with prior arrests had increased “appreciation of the right to counsel
and understanding of adjudicative proceedings” and that juveniles’ “time spent with attorneys
was a[n even] stronger predictor of understanding of interrogation rights and appreciation of
adjudicative proceedings”).
192 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 99. R
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tion, consult with counsel, and learn the consequences of waiving.193
Justice personnel described youths who invoked Miranda as “sophisti-
cated,” “savvy,” “streetwise,” “gang-involved,” or the like.194
C. Interrogation Tactics: On the Record
Police question suspects to obtain incriminating admissions or leads
to other evidence—physical evidence, other participants, witnesses, or
stolen property—which strengthen prosecutors’ cases and facilitate
guilty pleas.195  They seek suspects’ statements—true or false—to pin
them down, to control changes they later make in their stories, and to
impeach their credibility.196  Police described their roles to the 285
juveniles who waived as dispassionate fact-finders.197  Minnesota trains
officers to describe themselves as neutral report writers who want to
learn what happened to put in a statement for prosecutors and judges to
evaluate.198  They advise suspects that the interview is their opportunity
to “tell their story.”199
193 Id.
194 Id.  A police officer described youths who invoke as “more streetwise.  They’ve been
in the system.  They know that talking to us isn’t going to help them; it’s just going to help us
get them convicted.  They’re more streetwise, they’re tougher kids.  They know the game.” Id.
at 100. A public defender described them similarly:
[“They’re] the ones who have been through the system before and are more
savvy, are a little more streetwise.  They’ve dealt with police officers before.  Proba-
bly they’ve had either a lawyer or somebody give them advice that it’s not a good
idea to talk to police in previous cases.  Or if they’ve given a statement before and
it’s turned around and used against them actually.  Savviness or experience with the
criminal justice system.  The kids who have experience tend not to give up their
rights as easily as first-timers.[“]
Id. at 99–100.  A prosecutor attributed youths’ invocations “largely [to] prior exposure to the
system. . . .  Certain juveniles develop street smarts, savvy about the system.  Those are the
juveniles—repeated customers—who develop resistance to talking to the police because
they’ve learned.” Id. at 100.  A judge described youth who invoked as “kids who’ve been
through the system before, are more sophisticated.  They’re sometimes gang involved.  They
know more about the criminal justice system.  It’s not necessarily the severity of the crime, it’s
more their own level of sophistication.” Id. at 99–100.
195 Id. at 104.
196 Id. at 104–05.
197 Id. at 105–06.
198 Id. at 105.
199 Id. at 108.  Several officers gave similar descriptions of their standard opening to an
interrogation:
[“]You just go in and tell them that this is your opportunity to tell me your side
of the story.  I’ve already got the other side of the story.  I just want to hear what you
say happened, and then I’m going to write it up and send it on.  And they’ll decide.
But if you don’t want to tell me your side of the story, then they’re just going to
believe what this guy is telling them.[”]
Id.
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1. Maximization Techniques
Police may use a double-barreled approach to overcome resistance
and elicit confessions: maximization and minimization.200  Maximization
strategies overstate the seriousness of a crime, exaggerate the strength of
the evidence, and emphasize the futility of denials.201  Minimization
techniques offer sympathy, provide neutralizing themes and moral justi-
fications, offer face-saving alternatives, or shift blame to others to induce
a confession.202
Police reported that they used maximization techniques regularly.203
They initially encouraged a suspect to commit to a story—true or false—
and then used confrontational tactics to challenge the version.  Table 3
summarizes maximization strategies police used: confront with evidence
(54.4%); accuse of lying (32.6%); exhort to tell the truth (29.5%); ask
Behavioral Analysis Interview questions (28.8%); challenge inconsisten-
cies (20.0%); emphasize seriousness (14.4%); and accuse of other crimes
(8.4%).
In nearly one-third (30.9%) of interrogations, police did not use any
maximization tactics.  In another quarter (23.1%), they used only one.
This suggests that most juveniles did not require a lot of persuasion or
intimidation to talk.  Police used three or more maximization tactics in
fewer than one-third (31.6%) of cases.
200 See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 110; Kassin et al., Police- R
Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 12; Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, R
supra note 94, at 223; see also Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 278–79 R
(“[Interrogators] use . . . negative incentives (tactics that suggest the suspect should confess
because of no other plausible course of action) and positive incentives (tactics that suggest the
suspect will in some way feel better or benefit if he confesses).”). See generally Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 42–44 (describing the interrogation process, including the use of R
minimization).
201 See Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 12 (“Maximization R
[is] designed to convey . . . that the suspect is guilty and that all denials will fail.”); Kassin,
The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 223 (“[M]aximization[ ] . . . uses R
‘scare tactics’ designed to intimidate a suspect believed to be guilty.”).
202 Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 223 R
(“[M]inimization[ ] is a ‘soft sell’ technique in which the detective tries to lull the suspect into
a false sense of security by offering sympathy, tolerance, face-saving excuses, and moral justi-
fication; by blaming the victim or an accomplice; and by underplaying the seriousness or
magnitude of the charges.”).
203 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 110. R
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TABLE 3
MAXIMIZATION QUESTIONS: TYPES AND FREQUENCY
Interrogation Strategy N Percentage of Cases
Confront with Evidence 155 54.4
Accuse of Lying 93 32.6
Tell the Truth 84 29.5
BAI Questions 82 28.8
Confront 57 20.0
Trouble 41 14.4
Accuse Other Crimes 24 8.4
Number per Interrogation
None 95 30.9
One 71 23.1
Two 44 14.3
Three 38 12.4
Four 24 7.8
Five 24 7.8
Six 9 2.9
Seven 2 .7
Research involving adult suspects in England and Wales shows that
detectives typically confront a suspect with evidence.204  In about half
(54.4%) of the interrogations I studied, police confronted juveniles with
evidence.205  They most often referred to statements from witnesses or
co-offenders or physical evidence. In most cases, DNA, fingerprint, or
other forensic evidence will not be available in the short time between an
arrest and interrogation.  Police sometimes described an investigation as
204 See EVANS, THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS, supra note 118, at 33 R
(“[I]nterviewers stat[e] or hint[ ] that [scientific] evidence, for example finger print evidence,
would be or had been found and that therefore there was no point in denying the offence.”);
MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 78 (reporting that police R
pointed out contradictions between suspects’ and co-defendants’ or witnesses’ accounts, con-
front them with evidence, and urge them to tell the truth); Soukara et al., What Really Hap-
pens, supra note 108, at 495 (“[P]olice interviewers devoted most of their interviewing time to R
telling the suspects about the evidence against them and then accusing the suspects . . . .”); see
also Leo, Miranda’s Revenge, supra note 11, at 277 (describing how U.S. interviewers simi- R
larly appeal to “the weight of the incriminating evidence . . . against the suspect”).
205 See generally LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at R
139 (“Evidence ploys are used to make a suspect perceive that the case against him is so
overwhelming that he has no choice but to confess because no one will believe his assertions
of innocence.”).
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if they already had evidence.206  In other instances, they questioned
youths about potential evidence that investigation would reveal.207  They
asked how a juvenile would respond to hypothetical evidence—“what if
I told you that” someone had identified him or police found his finger-
prints.208  In another version, officers asked juveniles “is there any rea-
son why” his DNA might be on a gun or he would appear on surveillance
video.209
In about one-third (32.6%) of cases, officers accused juveniles of
lying.  They equally often (29.5%) urged juveniles to be honest and tell
the truth.  “You gotta give up the truth, the whole thing.  The only thing
that can help you is the truth.”210  Officers reaffirmed their roles as ob-
jective fact-gatherers and neutral conduits who would convey juveniles’
statements to prosecutors and judges.211  Police intimated that their rec-
ommendations could affect prosecutors’ charge evaluations and judges’
decisions.212  They cautioned that prosecutors and judges reacted nega-
tively to an implausible story and predicted that judges responded more
favorably to truthful defendants.213
The Reid Method instructs police to ask emotionally-charged Be-
havioral Analysis Interview (BAI) questions early in an interview to pro-
voke a reaction and to distinguish between innocent and guilty people.214
They posit that innocent and guilty people respond differently to emo-
206 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 115.  For example, an officer R
might describe the process that would lead to evidence as if it had already occurred: “What if I
said we’ve got a witness that saw you take it [the car]?” Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 119.
211 Id.  One officer reassured a suspect:
“That’s all I want is the truth.  You tell me you’re telling the truth and I’ll put that in
the report.  Because I can’t add anything.  It’s on the recorder.  So if you tell me
what you’re saying is the truth, then I’ll put it in there.  Simple as that.  All I want to
know is what happened.”
Id.
212 Id. at 124.
213 Id. at 124, 133–34.  An interviewer warned one juvenile:
[“]You have got to think about what the judge is going to say to you, because we’re
going to do a detailed report on what happened during this interview that is being
taped.  If I’m a judge and I’m listening to somebody that is cooperative with the
police, willing to help them out, I’m going to be a little more lenient if I was a judge.
If I’m a judge and I hear a guy doing what you’re doing, saying you know what—
’I’m not giving that up’—what do you think the judge is going to do?  Do you think
he’s going to give you a harder punishment?[”]
Id.
214 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 173–206 (recommending investigators begin R
interrogations with a BAI, giving illustrations of response-provoking questions and examples
of how they work from actual interviews, explaining how to analyze suspects’ responses, and
describing specialized BAI questioning techniques).
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tionally provocative questions, which enables investigators to classify
them appropriately.215  Leo reported BAI questions in about 40% of in-
terrogations.216  In this study, BAI questions occurred in about one-quar-
ter (28.8%) of interviews, most frequently: “Do you know why I have
asked to talk to you here today?”217
In one-fifth (20%) of cases, officers challenged suspects’ assertions.
They pointed out inconsistencies, disputed claims, and questioned
youths’ credibility to increase their anxiety.218  Officers regularly de-
scribed juveniles’ claims of innocence as “bullshit.”219  Although many
interviews began with an invitation to “tell his story,” police warned that
it was time-limited—take it or leave it.220  If youths did not take advan-
tage of this opportunity to explain their involvement, they might regret it
later if other co-offenders tried to shift responsibility or make a deal at
their expense.221
2. Minimization Techniques
Minimization tactics use themes to reduce or neutralize guilt by of-
fering excuses or justifications, by suggesting a less odious motivation,
or by shifting blame to a victim or accomplice.222  Police used minimiza-
215 Id.; see, e.g., id. at 180 (“[T]he motivation question should be asked. . . .  In most
crimes, an innocent suspect can be expected to offer a reasonable motive for the crime. . . .
Conversely, the motive question is very threatening to the guilty suspect because he knows
exactly why he committed the crime . . . .”).  Despite Inbau and Reid’s claims of diagnosticity,
see supra note 101 and accompanying text, police cannot accurately distinguish between truth- R
tellers and liars, see Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 37 (“[P]sychological research . . . R
has failed to support the claim that groups of individuals can attain high average levels of
accuracy in judging truth and deception. . . .  [T]raining programs produce, at best, small and
inconsistent improvements[,] and . . . police investigators . . . perform only slightly better than
chance, if at all.” (citation omitted)), and BAI questions do not provoke expected responses
from liars and truth-tellers. See Aldert Vrij, et al., An Empirical Test of the Behavior Analysis
Interview, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 329 (2006) (“[T]he BAI questioning led to differences
between liars and truth-tellers but the difference was in the opposite direction to that antici-
pated by Inbau et al.”).
216 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 278 tbl.5. R
217 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 120. R
218 Id. at 121.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 153 R
(“[M]inimizing . . . ‘themes’ . . . work by shifting the blameworthiness of the act from the
suspect to another person; by attributing the blameworthiness to the social circumstances that
allegedly led to the act; or by redefining the act in a way that appears to minimize, reduce, or
even eliminate the suspect’s culpability because the act now seems less criminal or no longer
criminal at all.”); Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 223; see R
also INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 232 (“[T]he investigator should . . . present[ ] a ‘moral R
excuse’ for the suspect’s commission of the offense or minimiz[e] the moral implications of
the conduct.”).  See generally Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at R
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tion tactics in less than one-fifth (17.3%) of interrogations,223 far less
frequently than they used maximization tactics (69.1%).224  Even though
prosecutors charged all these youths with felonies, one officer explained
that “most of these are fairly minor, so you don’t have to do a whole lot
of minimizing.”225  Table 4 reports that officers used themes to reduce
suspects’ guilt in 15.4% of cases; appealed to self-interest in one-tenth
(11.9%) of cases; and expressed empathy in one-tenth of cases (10.5%).
The relative absence of minimizing statements is consistent with English
and Welsh research showing such tactics are rarely used in recorded in-
terviews226 and with Minnesota police training, which discourages their
use.227
TABLE 4
MINIMIZATION QUESTIONS: TYPES AND FREQUENCIES
Interrogation Strategy N Percentage of Cases
Neutralization 44 15.4
Appeal to Self Interest 34 11.9
Empathy 30 10.5
Appeal to Honor 25 8.8
Minimize Seriousness 15 5.3
Third Parties 10 3.5
Number per Interrogation
None 254 82.7
One 33 10.7
Two 14 4.6
Three 5 1.6
Four 1 .3
The Reid Method teaches police to develop a theme to neutralize
suspects’ guilt and minimize their responsibility, making it easier for
them to confess.228  Criminologists explain how youths rationalize delin-
29–30 (discussing how minimization techniques’ implicit promises of leniency can lead in-
nocents to confess and suggesting possible solutions to limit this danger).
223 Infra Table 4.
224 Supra Table 3.
225 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 127. R
226 See Soukara et al., What Really Happens, supra note 108, at 502 (“The tactics deemed R
by several psychologists to be the most problematic (i.e. intimidation, minimisation, situational
futility, and maximization) never or almost never occurred.”).
227 NELSON, supra note 111, at 11–12. R
228 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 232 n.6 (“Psychologists refer to this internal R
process as techniques of neutralization.  Those classifications are remarkably similar to what
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quent behavior using similar neutralizations and minimizations.229  Many
themes derive from responsibility-reducing criminal defenses: provoca-
tion, intoxication, duress, and insanity.230  For example, delinquents may
reject mental illness—insanity—as an excuse, but embrace the idea of
“going crazy” or “being mad” to rationalize conduct.231  Police some-
times suggested that getting mad, losing control, or excitement accounted
for youths’ misconduct.232  Intoxication explains bad behavior and drink-
ing alcohol or using drugs lessened a juvenile’s responsibility for his
behavior.233  Juveniles are more likely than adults to commit crimes in
groups,234 and police diffuse responsibility by suggesting they suc-
cumbed to negative peer influences, shifting blame to others.235  Parents
we refer to as themes (for example, ‘denial of responsibility,’ ‘denial of injury,’ ‘denial of
victim,’ and ‘condemnation of the condemners’).”).
229 E.g., Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of
Delinquency, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 664 (1957) (arguing that neutralizations defuse guilt and re-
duce culpability, allowing youths to lessen their own responsibility, blame victims, or provide
mitigating justifications).
230 DAVID MATZA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 69–98 (1964) (arguing that juveniles drift
into delinquency by using rationales that resemble legal justifications for crimes and that re-
lease them from moral constraints).  Matza states, “The major bases of negation and irrespon-
sibility in law rest on self-defense, insanity, and accident; so, too, in the subculture of
delinquency.  The restraint of law is episodically neutralized through an expansion of each
extenuating circumstances beyond a point countenanced in law.” Id. at 74.
231 Id. at 83–85.
232 Officers regularly used themes of being “out of control”:
[“]I can understand you’re whipped up.  You’re adrenalized.  You’ve seen this
going on.  You’re in a frenzy, that sometimes you just do stuff and you don’t remem-
ber what happened.  Could it have been that things just kind of got out of control and
that you just got wrapped up in it and kicked him a couple of times?[”]
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 129. R
233 See MATZA, supra note 230, at 84 (“From the delinquent viewpoint, however, the R
offense is certainly mitigated and often negated.  Being under the influence of alcohol is lik-
ened to losing one’s mind, going crazy.”).  Officers offered intoxication as a face-saving ex-
planation for juveniles’ misconduct:
“There was probably a lot of people drinking down there.  I’m not saying you were
the only one and I’m not trying—don’t worry about minor consumption and that
kind of stuff, because I’m not worried about that.  I just wanna get your mind frame
here when you picked up the knife.  I’m not saying it was right if you were drinking,
but what I’m saying is, was alcohol a factor?”
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 129. R
234 HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVE-
NILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 123 (2006).
235 Officers regularly suggested that youths succumbed to peer-pressure to mitigate their
responsibility:
[“]Rick [the suspect] knew he made a mistake.  Maybe Rick was forced to do it.
I know how peer pressure goes.  You know, I went along to be with the crowd,
because I thought it was cool at the time. . . .  ‘Come on, let’s be cool and do it.
Come on, let’s do it.  Let’s do it for the dare.’  Right? . . .  Rick, we want your side
of the story.  How did you do it?  Why did you do it?  Did someone make you do it?
Did someone bully you into doing it or dare you to do it?[”]
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 130. R
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regularly refer to errant children’s behavior as a mistake, and police reg-
ularly described juveniles’ delinquency as a mistake to mitigate responsi-
bility.236  Police appealed to juveniles’ self-interest in one-tenth (11.9%)
of cases.237  They told them they would feel emotional relief,238 prosecu-
tors and judges would view them more favorably,239 and intimated they
might deal with them more leniently.240  Officers minimized a youth’s
crime by comparing it with more serious offenses.241  Even a serious
crime—a drive-by shooting—could have been worse if the shooter had
236 Id.  An interrogator explained away juvenile’s suspected crime by characterizing it as
a mistake:
“Now I can understand that at your age, you don’t think about the future too
much; you think about today.  Because of that, you’re young and you make mis-
takes.  I can understand because you’re human and you’re young and you make
mistakes.  But you have to be man enough to face up to it here and tell the system
that ‘Yeah, I made a mistake and I’m sorry for it, and I’m going to change.’”
Id.
237 Supra Table 4.
238 Interrogators referred to a juvenile’s burden of emotional guilt and, as part of the
youth’s emotional expiation, assured they would convey the youth’s feelings of remorse about
the crime to the authorities:
“[Y]ou got a boulder on your shoulder about the size of Mt. Everest.  I mean, you
gotta feel like the whole weight is on your shoulders. . . .  But you gotta trust me
when I tell you . . . I need the whole truth and I’ll write the truth as you give it.  And
if after you tell me the truth, you tell me you’re sorry, I’m gonna write down that
you said you’re sorry.  That you never wished it would have happened.”
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 133. R
239 Police told juveniles that the prosecutors and judge reacted more favorably to youths
who cooperated, told the truth, or assisted officers:
[“]‘[Y]ou’re cooperative.  You’re helping us get stuff back.  You’re showing us something. . . .
You’re making a step in the right direction.’  How do you think that looks?  Rather than sitting
there like a hard-ass: ‘No, I didn’t do it.’  And then you wait to be convicted.  You wait to be
found guilty of something with a bad attitude.[”]
Id.
240 Interrogators advised juveniles that judges viewed suspects who confessed and as-
sumed responsibility more positively:
[“]If you did something that you know you shouldn’t have, and you ‘fess up to
it and tell me everything that happened, and you express remorse, and you acknowl-
edge that it was a stupid kid thing to do, a mistake, that is going to be seen way more
favorably than sticking with this story that you have come up with and making me
put that down on the report and presenting it to a judge.  Put yourself in the judge’s
shoes.  If you were going to give leniency, do you think that you would give it to the
guy who is obviously lying through his teeth . . . or would you rather give a little
leniency to the guy who is stepping up to the plate, acknowledging the stupid kid
mistake that he did, and is willing to acknowledge that he screwed up?[”]
Id. at 134.
241 Police questioning a juvenile about a burglary told him:
[“Y]ou’ve already said that you went into your neighbor’s house.  All we need to
know is your side of the story—I mean, error in judgment?  People make it all the
time.  Now, it’s not like you went in and robbed some old lady and beat her to death,
okay?  You went into someone [sic] house.[”]
Id. at 137.
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hit the intended target.242  The rationale of juvenile courts—treatment
rather than punishment—provides a theme with which to minimize
seriousness.243
D. Interrogation Outcomes and Lengths
This section examines how the 285 youths who waived Miranda
responded to police.  It describes how their attitudes affected the infor-
mation they provided.  It reports the evidentiary value of statements they
gave.  And it examines how long interrogations take.
1. Outcomes: Confessions, Admissions, and Denials
Table 5 reports the outcomes of interrogations—confess, admit, or
deny244—based on their evidentiary value.245  A majority (58.6%) of
juveniles confessed, most within a few minutes of waiving Miranda.
One officer said, “A lot of kids seem to admit right away.  It seems like
the majority of kids admit right away.”246  Similarly, researchers John
Pearse and Gisli Gudjonsson analyzed police interviews recorded in
London, England, and found about half of the suspects confesssed and,
of those who did, “almost all did so very near to the beginning of the
interviews.”247  Their research suggested “suspects enter a police inter-
view having already decided whether to admit or deny the allegations
242 Officers minimized the seriousness of what happened, compared with what could have
happened:
“The big thing is nobody got hurt here.  I mean, this is a serious matter, but it
could—it could be a lot worse.  It really could. . . .  Nobody, nobody got killed,
nobody got hurt.  I mean, this is still a serious thing.  Everybody makes mistakes.
But now is your time for you to tell your version of it.”
Id.
243 Officers sometimes reminded juveniles, “This is juvenile not adult.  You’re not going
to prison.  The purpose of juvenile is rehabilitation, not punishment.  We want to get you
help.” Id.
244 See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 144–45.  Police elicited a R
confession when a juvenile admitted that he committed the crime with supporting details or his
cumulative responses satisfied all of the elements of an offense, i.e., act and intent. Id. at
145–46.  Questioners received an admission when it linked a youth to a crime or provided
direct or circumstantial evidence of one or more elements of the offense. Id. at 146.  Admis-
sions often occurred when a get-away driver, look-out, or co-defendant admitted participating,
but minimized her role. See id.  Denials occurred when a juvenile disavowed knowledge or
participation or gave an explanation that did not include any incriminating admissions. Id. at
147.
245 See generally Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, at 862 (observing that evaluating R
the outcomes of interrogations involves a degree of subjectivity); Wald et al., supra note 115, R
at 1643–47 (categorizing interrogations as “successful” or “unsuccessful” based on whether
suspects talked and on whether they confessed).
246 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 145. R
247 Soukara et al., What Really Happens, supra note 108, at 495 (citing John Pearse & R
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Police Interviewing Techniques at Two South London Police Stations, 3
PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 63 (1996)).
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against them”248 and interrogation tactics have little impact on whether
they subsequently admit.249
TABLE 5
OUTCOME OF INTERROGATION AND YOUTHS’ ATTITUDE
Outcome of Interrogation Youths’ Attitude*
Cooperative Resistant
Outcome  N Percent N Percent N Percent
Confession 167 58.6 162 71.4 5 8.6
Admission 85 29.8 57 25.1 28 48.3
Denial 33 11.6 8 3.5 25 43.1
227 79.6 58 20.4
Corroborating Evidence 52 18.2
*Statistically Significant at: c2(1, N = 285) = 7.84, p < .001
Other studies report similar high rates of success.  The Yale–New
Haven study reported that more than half (57%) of interrogations pre-
ceded by Miranda warnings produced some evidence.250  Leo reported
three-quarters (78%) of adult suspects waived Miranda251 and two-thirds
(64%) made an incriminating statement or a partial or full confession.252
Police investigators estimated that two-thirds (68%) of suspects made
incriminating statements.253  Psychologists Rebecca Milne and Colin
Clarke, a police officer at the time of the study, evaluated interrogations
by six English and Welsh police forces and reported confessions in 40%
of cases and partial admissions in another 25%.254  Another English and
Welsh study concluded juvenile suspects “readily confessed” in three-
quarters (77%) of cases.255
248 John Pearse & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Police Interviewing Techniques at Two South
London Police Stations, 3 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 63, 73 (1996), quoted in MILNE & BULL,
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 81. R
249 MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 81. R
250 Wald et al., supra note 115, 1565 tbl.11 (showing that 50 warned interrogations out of R
87 produced evidence).
251 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 276 tbl.3. R
252 Id. at 280 tbl.7.  If interrogations terminated upon a suspect’s invocation of Miranda
are excluded, the amount of successful interrogations rises to over three-fourths (76%). Id. at
281.
253 Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation, supra note 129, at 392. R
254 Bull & Milne, Attempts to Improve the Police Interviewing of Suspects, supra note
105, at 189 (citing COLIN CLARKE & REBECCA MILNE, NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE PEACE R
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING COURSE (2001)).
255 EVANS, THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS, supra note 118, at 29 (“[T]his open R
admission usually occurred in the first sentence or so of the interview.”).
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About one-third (29.8%) of juveniles provided statements of some
evidentiary value—for example, admitting that they served as a look-out
during a robbery or participated in a burglary, even if they did not per-
sonally steal property.256  Justice personnel agreed that most juveniles
made some incrimination admissions.257  Only a small proportion
(11.6%) of juveniles gave no incriminating information.258  Forms of re-
sistance included non-cooperation, steadfast denial of knowledge or par-
ticipation, lying, evasion, silence, or blame shifting.259
2. Attitudes and Outcomes
Juveniles’ attitudes affect the exercise of police discretion.260  For
less serious crimes, a deferential attitude reduces likelihood of arrest, and
a contumacious one increases it.261  Youths’ attitudes affect how police
256 Supra Table 5.
257 A police officer said, “‘Most of them will pretty much tell you the whole truth, but not
necessarily all the truth.  They may still want to hide a little bit of what they did because they
know they were wrong.  It could be very embarrassing for them.’” FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 146.  A judge observed, R
“[Juveniles] just talk [when police question them].  They just cough it up.  Some of
them are deceitful and more clever, but they still talk.  Some of them think they can
talk their way out of it, but they’re dealing with a professional investigator, and that
normally doesn’t end well for them.”
Id.
258 Supra Table 5.
259 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 147. R
260 See Egon Bittner, Policing Juveniles: The Social Context of Common Practice, in
PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 69, 82 (Margaret K. Rosenheim ed., 1976) (“[P]olice judg-
ment of substantive misconduct will be mitigated  by expressions of diffidence on the part of
young people and aggravated by their arrogance.” (citation omitted)). But see John P. Clark &
Richard E. Sykes, Some Determinants of Police Organization and Practice in a Modern Indus-
trial Democracy, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 455, 488 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974)
(“[D]isrespect may increase the chances of arrest somewhat, but it is a much less powerful
predictor than type of offense.”).
261 See Bittner, supra note 260, at 82.  For research on the impact of adults’ demeanor on R
arrest decisions, see generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUS-
PECT INTO CUSTODY 146–47 (1965) (“[A]n officer . . . might arrest a person who ordinarily
would not be arrested . . . solely because he has incurred the disfavor of a particular officer[ ]
. . . .”); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY 89–90 (1966) (“[W]hen [the street patrolman] encounters arrogance or hostility on
the part of the citizenry, he may be tempted to make strong claims of authority . . . .”).  For
research on how youths’ demeanor affects arrest decisions, see generally AARON V. CICOUREL,
THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (Transaction Publishers 1995); Bittner,
supra note 260, at 81–83 (“The decision of what has to be done takes shape in a relationship to R
how the young people act toward the intervening patrolmen.”); Irving Piliavin & Scott Briar,
Police Encounters with Juveniles, 7 AM. J. SOC. 206 (1964) (observing the influence of
juveniles’ attitudes and police prejudice on officers’ decisions to arrest, cite, or admonish ap-
prehended juvenile offenders).
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and probation officers perceive them, impute moral character, and re-
spond to them.262
Juveniles’ attitudes during interrogation ranged the gamut—”some
are scared to death, and others, it’s almost a joke.”263  Many officers
described youths as scared, especially “the kids that are new to the pro-
cess.”264  Although police described some youths as confrontational, jus-
tice system personnel viewed most youths as compliant or submissive: “I
would say that 90% or more would probably be cooperative, and the
other percentage would be the frequent fliers, so to speak.”265  Several
officers used the same expression—“deer in the headlights”—to describe
youths’ demeanor.266  Public defenders described their clients as hum-
bled or defeated.267
Police reports frequently describe juveniles’ demeanor and behavior
during interrogation.  Officers documented whether they believed sus-
262 See CICOUREL, supra note 261, at 40 (“The decision to arrest, file a petition, and R
recommend, for example, probation, a foster home, a boys’ ranch, or the youth authority
seemed directly influenced by oral remarks and physical gestures which are difficult to docu-
ment and may never appear on official records.”); see also Bittner, supra note 260, at 81–85 R
(“[P]olicemen tend to be sensitive concerning respect[ ] . . . .  They apparently believe that
anyone who would risk being rebellious and unruly in their presence can be counted on to go
even further if left alone.”); cf. Robert M. Emerson, Role Determinants in Juvenile Court, in
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 621, 626 (Daniel Glaser ed., 1974) (“[T]he power to arrest and to
initiate court action becomes a strategic weapon used to . . . threaten[ ] the youth into better
behavior. . . .  [C]ourt action may be initiated when a policeman has his authority assaulted or
challenged in what otherwise might be an inconsequential encounter with a youth.”). Com-
pare WILLIAM A. WESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW,
CUSTOM, AND MORALITY 85–86 (1970) (“[W]ith the quiet, repentant, fearful child . . . , the
police will attempt to deal with the problem themselves. . . .  The older delinquents[ ] . . .
become a threatening group for the policeman.  Many find that they can no longer treat [these]
delinquents . . . as children, since boys of this age are particularly obnoxious to the police-
man.”), with Donald J. Black & Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AM. SOC.
REV. 63 (1970) (“When the suspect behaves antagonistically toward the police, the [arrest] rate
is higher . . . .  [H]owever, . . . the arrest rate for encounters involving very deferential suspects
is . . . the same as that for the antagonistic group. . . .  [J]uveniles who are . . . particularly
liable to arrest may be especially deferential toward the police as a . . . self-defense.”).
263 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 150.  One officer used the R
term “felony mouth” to describe “kids trying to be men who have no men in their lives.” Id. at
151.  One consequence, the officer explained, was that “cops take them to jail to teach them
who is boss.  Felony mouth will get you a ride to the jail.” Id.
264 Id. at 150.
265 Id. at 151.
266 Id.
267 One explained:
[“]Most of the time, they’re just sort of very monotone.  I almost feel like I’m
watching someone that’s just given up.  There’s kind of a hopelessness to being
interviewed by police.  Occasionally, you get the really conduct disordered kids who
really cop an attitude, but they’re the exception to the rule.  Most of the kids are
fighting off the tears, maybe trying to act tough, but very monotone.  On the videos,
their heads are down.  They just feel like they’ve already been beat.[”]
Id.
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pects told the truth or lied and whether suspects cooperated or resisted.268
Reports described youths’ emotional or behavioral responses to their in-
terrogators.269  Based on my impressions and officers’ reports, I charac-
terized youths’ attitudes as either cooperative or resistant.270  As Table 5
reports, the vast majority of juveniles (79.6%) exhibited a cooperative
demeanor, and only one-fifth (20.4%) appeared resistant.  Not surpris-
ingly, the vast majority (96.5%) of cooperative juveniles confessed or
made incriminating admissions.271  By contrast, fewer than than one in
ten (8.5%) resistant juveniles confessed, and almost half (43.1%) pro-
vided no useful admissions.272  One-tenth (11.6%) of youths denied in-
volvement, but those who exhibited resistant attitudes accounted for
more than three-quarters of them (75.8%).273
3. Corroborationg Evidence
Police question suspects to elicit incriminating statements or leads
regarding other evidence: witnesses, co-offenders, or property.  “[A]
principal purpose—if not the primary purpose—of interrogation is to ob-
tain information such as the location of physical evidence.”274  Some
commenters, however, have contended “police rarely obtain[ ] incrimi-
nating fruits” from interrogations.275
Table 5 reports how often interrogations yielded corroborating evi-
dence.  I defined corroborating evidence as evidence police did not pos-
sess prior to questioning—e.g. leads to physical evidence, a crime scene
268 Id. at 151–52.  One report noted the juvenile “was cooperative.  He stated he was sorry
he stole the items.” Id. at 152.  Another officer’s report described the juvenile whom he ques-
tioned as “cooperative and forthright throughout the interview.” Id.  An officer described an-
other youth as “not very cooperative.  He was kind of just sit there and stare down at his legs
[sic].” Id.  Police implied that youths’ attitudes and cooperation would affect how the justice
system treated them: “For what it’s worth, two people were arrested.  If that guy spills the
beans, tell [sic] me everything I ask him—because you won’t—if he does, he looks more
cooperative than you.  And you’re okay with that?  Because I’m going to mark you down as
uncooperative.” Id.
269 “Marvin’s demeanor during my interview showed no remorse.  Marvin at times had a
flat affect and at other times appeared to be slightly amused by my questions.” Id.  Police
described youths’ behavior as well.  An officer depicted a juvenile who became “increasingly
agitated during the interview”: “His demeanor varied between sarcastic and angry.  [He] be-
came increasingly hostile and asked for a lawyer, and I ended the interview.  As he was leav-
ing the room, he turned in the doorway and glared at me and was yelling obscenities.” Id.
270 Other research, using similar categories, described 80% of suspects as “cooperative”
or “remorseful.”  Baldwin, supra note 1, at 332 tbl.1. R
271 Supra Table 5.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and
Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV., 929, 1000 (1995).
275 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, at 880–81. But see Wald et al., supra note 115, at R
1593–95 (explaining that the analyzed interrogations produced information which implicated
accomplices and solved other crimes committed by the suspect).
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diagram, identity of a co-offender or unknown witness.  By this standard,
fewer than one-fifth (18.2%) of interviews yielded information that po-
lice did not already have.276  Some police attributed the relatively low-
yield of corroborating evidence to time pressure and volume of cases
under which they labored.277  Once they obtained an admission, which
they did quickly, they seldom pressed youths for additional evidence.278
Prosecutors confirmed interrogations did not often lead to corroborating
evidence but attributed that to good preliminary investigation.279
4. Length of Interrogation
Police typically interrogate innocent suspsects for six hours or
longer before eliciting false confessions.280  Are lengthy interrogations
common?  Or are lengthy interrogations and the concommitant risk of
false confessions outliers from routine questioning?  If the latter, then
should policy makers limit the length of interrogations to preserve the
integrity of the justice process?
Table 6 reports the length of interrogations, the length of time by
type of offense, and the length of time by whether the offense involved a
firearm.281  Routine felony interrogations are brief.  Police completed
three-quarters (77.2%) of felony interviews in less than fifteen minutes
and nine-tenths (90.5%) in less than thirty minutes.282  In the longest
interviews, police questioned three youths (1.1%) for more than one and
one-half hours.283  Although prosecutors charged all the interviewed
276 Supra Table 5.
277 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 154. R
278 One officer said, “They’re used to, ‘Alright you gave it to me.  I don’t need anything
else.  We’re out of this room.’  If, had the cop asked one more question down the road—’Did
you tell anyone else about that?’—that does not show up because it’s not part of those cases.”
Id.
279 A prosecutor said, “I don’t see that very often.  I don’t know if that’s because by the
time the police talk to that suspect they have done such a good job with their investigation that
they have everything else, but I don’t see very often that it leads to other evidence.” Id.
280 See Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 948 R
(“[I]nterrogation-induced false confessions tend to be correlated with lengthy interrogations in
which the innocent suspect’s resistance is worn down[ ] . . . .”); infra notes 363–368 and R
accompanying text.
281 To measure length of interrogation, in some cases, I directly timed the tape.  In most
transcripts, officers stated the times at the beginning and ending of an interrogation.  In other
cases, to approximate the length of interrogations for which I had only transcripts, I estimated
the duration of interrogation from the length of the transcript by cross-tabulating the transcript
pages and length of interrogations in cases in which I had both. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CON-
FESSIONS, supra note 12, at 155. R
282 Infra Table 6.
283 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 156. R
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youths with felonies, these brief interrogations are unlikely to elicit false
confessions.284
TABLE 6
LENGTH OF INTERROGATION BY TYPE OF OFFENSE*
AND WEAPON**
Overall Person Property Drug Firearms Other
Time (minutes) N % N % N % N % N % N %
1 - 15 220 77.2 62 67.4 131 83.4 15 93.8 9 60 3 60
16 - 30 38 13.3 20 21.7 13 8.3 1 6.3 3 20 1 20
31+ 27 9.5 10 10.9 13 8.3 0 0 3 20 1 20
Total 285 92 157 16 15 5
Cases Involving Firearms
Overall No Gun Gun
Time (minutes) N % N % N %
1 - 15 220 77.2 192 80.3 28 60.9
16 - 30 38 13.3 29 12.1 9 19.6
31+ 27 9.5 18 7.5 9 19.6
Total 285 239 46
*Statistically Significant at: c2(1, N = 285) = 32.3, p < .05
**Statistically Significant at: c2(1, N = 285) = 9.4, p < .01
The brevity of these interviews was initially surprising, but interro-
gations of even two or three hours are exceptional.285  Various studies
have reported that interrogations lasted less than one hour in 85% of
cases,286 one hour in about three-quarters (71.3%) of cases,287 thirty min-
utes in 87% of cases,288 fifteen minutes in 71.4% of cases,289 and 30
minutes in 80% of cases and one hour in 95%.290  Inbau and Reid advise
against interrogations that last longer than four hours,291 a duration sub-
stantially longer than observed in any research.
284 See Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Prac-
tices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda’s Failure]
(“[I]nterrogations conducted in low profile cases . . . would be much less likely to produce a
false confession.  In low profile cases, interrogators are generally disinclined to expend the
time or employ the range of tactics likely to produce an untrustworthy confession.”).
285 See Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 948 (“[M]ore R
than 90% of normal interrogations last less than two hours.”); Kassin et al., Police Interview-
ing and Interrogation, supra note 129, at 384 (“[R]outine interrogations tend to be relatively R
brief encounters, with the modal duration ranging from 20 minutes to an hour.” (citation
omitted)).
286 Wald et al., supra note 115, at 1542 tbl.1. R
287 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 279 tbl.6. R
288 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, at 892 tbl.7. R
289 EVANS, THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS, supra note 118, at 26. R
290 Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 89, at 46. R
291 INBAU ET AL., supra note 102, at 597. But see id. at 237 (“After three or four hours, R
unless the suspect is showing clear potential for telling the truth . . . , the investigator should
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I asked justice professionals to estimate the lengths of interviews,
and they all agreed that interviews were “very short.”292  Justice system
personnel attributed the brevity of felony interrogations to several fac-
tors.  Many referred to police workload pressures.293  Police conducted a
form of triage and questioned suspects longer in more serious cases but
did not regard most juvenile felonies as serious crimes.294  Several of-
ficers attributed brief interrogations to the relative simplicity of most
youth crime and their ability to elicit admissions quickly.295
consider terminating the interrogation session and perhaps re-interrogating the suspect at a
later time using a different technique.” (emphasis added)).
292 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 157.  Their estimates of the R
average length only ranged from ten to thirty minutes. Id.  A veteran officer recollected, “My
longest has maybe been an hour.” Id.  One judge guessed “fifteen or twenty minutes,” a sec-
ond judge confirmed “usually ten to twenty minutes,” and a third agreed, “It doesn’t take very
long to get them to ‘fess up; twenty minutes.” Id.  A prosecutor said the length of interroga-
tions are “very short, usually”: “I would say under ten minutes, the vast majority, under ten
minutes.” Id.  Public defenders thought that typical interrogations took thirty minutes at most.
Id.  The longest estimate of average interrogation time was “thirty to forty-five minutes.” Id.
These responses confirmed my findings are reasonable and consistent with the experience of
legal professionals.
293 One officer explained, “These guys are in the meat grinders.  We got to get out of
here.  I got ten cases I got assigned today.  Either you’re going to give this up today—they
don’t ask the extra questions, once you told me you did it.” Id.
294 An officer described how police prioritized their caseloads:
[“]When you get to a lot of the minor stuff—the shoplifting, the fights in
school, and stuff like that—we get too many of them.  The cops are trying to push
through those.  We’ve got two dozen cases sitting on our desk.  You’re not going to
spend an hour an hour and half with an assault in school.  With an ag[gravated]
robbery, you’re going to take the time and effort—just more complexity to the
crime.  It doesn’t take much time for Joe to tell me, ‘He said my girlfriend is ugly, so
I punched him.’[”]
Id. at 157–58.  Prosecutors agreed that volume of cases and police staff reductions precluded
extensive interviews with most juveniles:
“It’s a lack of resources now.  They just don’t have as much time to devote to juve-
nile cases unless they’re really serious.  I’ve kind of noticed that there isn’t as much
effort to try to—I’m not saying coerce a confession—but trying to get to the truth,
not calling them on inconsistencies.”
Id. at 158.  A juvenile court judge confirmed that workload pressures, a high-level of success-
ful questioning, and the diminishing marginal utility of longer interrogations contributed to the
brevity of questioning:
“Police are busy, and they’re moving on with what they need to do.  They’re not
there to socialize.  They’re there to get their job done and move on.  They’ve got a
ton of work to do in that case and lots of others.  So they’re trying to be efficient,
and a longer interrogation probably wouldn’t produce more than what they’ve al-
ready got.”
Id.
295 Officers attributed brief interrogations to suspects confessing without much
prompting:
“If you get them to tell you the truth, there ain’t nothing else to talk about.  Once you
get the statement from them, once you get the story from them, that’s all you need.
You’re not going to sit around and hold their hand all day.  Here’s the statement.
Let’s move on.”
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a) Interrogation and Guns
Detectives question suspects longer about more serious crimes.296
In this study, a statistically significant relationship appeared between
length of interrogation and type of offense.  Police questioned a higher
percentage of youths charged with property and drug crimes for fifteen
minutes or less than they did youths charged with other, more serious
offenses.297  Crimes involving physical evidence—drugs, stolen prop-
erty, automobiles—may provided more leverage with which to quickly
extract confessions.
Cases involving firearms produced longer interrogations.298  Al-
though police questioned only 9.5% of suspects for longer than thirty
minutes, they interrogated twice as many (20%) juveniles whose offenses
involved firearms—armed robbery, assault with a gun, firearms posses-
sion, or burglary in which youths stole guns—for longer than thirty min-
utes.299  Guns provide an indicator of offense seriousness.300  Police
wanted to recover guns and questioned juveniles involved with them
longer and more aggressively.301  Interviewers made implied promises of
benefits to induce youths to help recover guns.302  Police used tactics like
those described in Rhode Island v. Innis303 to impress upon suspects the
danger guns pose to those in possession of them and to those near
them.304  Officers threatened youths, warning them they could be held
Id.
296 See Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 93, at 297 (reporting that detec- R
tives were twice as likely—42% vs. 20%—to question suspects for more than one hour in high
seriousness crimes and about three times as likely to conclude low seriousness interviews in
less than thirty minutes).
297 Supra Table 6.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 See Podkopacz & Feld, The End of the Line, supra note 128, at 474 tbl.3 (showing that R
judges were more likely to transfer juveniles to adult court if they were charged with felonies
involving use of a weapon).
301 FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 159. R
302 For example, one interrogator hinted at leniency if a suspect helped locate a gun:
“Now if you made a goodwill effort and if I got the gun, certainly I would mention
that to the county attorney that you helped out in retrieving that gun.  Will that help
you?  I say that Sam helped me out getting the gun, and I don’t think I could have
found the gun without his help.  You tell me, does that help you?  Yeah, it would
help you a lot.”
Id. at 160.
303 See 446 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1980) (explaining how two arresting officers convinced a
suspect in custody to reveal the location of a hidden gun by discussing aloud that it “would be
too bad” if a little girl “would pick up the gun, maybe kill herself”).
304 An officer questioned one youth and warned of the dangers the gun posed to innocent
bystanders:
“We know that that gun is out there.  That gun hasn’t been recovered.  At least help
me find where the gun is, so a young, innocent kid doesn’t pick that up and hurt
himself or someone else.  Just imagine if that is your younger brother or sister, just
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responsible for any crimes committed by others using guns they had sto-
len or hidden.305  Two interrogations in this study raised constitutional
issues of voluntariness, and both involved guns.306  The questioning of
the juveniles implicated in both offenses lasted longer than any other
interrogation in this study, used more maximization techniques, and in-
cluded explicit quid pro quo promises of leniency in exchange for recov-
ering the guns.307
Justice system personnel agreed that guns provide a proxy for seri-
ousness and affected the length of interrogations.308  Police associated
guns with gangs—another indicator of seriousness.309  Police questioned
youths to learn who else had contact with the weapon.310  Youths knew
that guns garnered serious consequences, raised the stakes, and gave
them greater incentive to resist interrogators.311
imagine if that was your brother or sister: how would you feel if that gun got into
their hands?”
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 160. R
305 Immediately after the Miranda warning, an officer gave a gun burglary suspect an
extended monologue with several themes about the dangers of guns:
[“]The biggest thing that I don’t want to see happen is to see you get in any
worse trouble than you’re in right now.  Does that make sense? . . .  [B]ecause of that
rifle that’s out there, and if somebody uses that rifle now, a year from now, and kills
somebody, that’s coming right back to your mailbox. . . .  [N]ow there’s a weapon
involved, and we’ve got to get that weapon back. . . .  [I]s that something that you’re
gonna help us get done or not?  Because I wouldn’t want to see you end up spending
the next—you know, God forbid that someone gets killed with that in the near fu-
ture.  I’d hate to see you end up in prison for thirty years.[”]
Id. at 160–61.
306 See Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles, supra note 11, at 295–304 (discussing R
voluntariness of statements, quid-pro-quo offers of leniency, and interrogations focused on
recovering guns).
307 Id. at 298.
308 One judge said guns are “an indicator to almost everybody in the system that things
are going to the serious level.  So much of adult and juvenile criminal conduct is really chicken
shit, but when a weapon shows up, that opens the door to much more serious conduct.” FELD,
KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12 at 165. R
309 One officer observed:
“It’s more than likely a gang member, so not only is their own offense history going
to play into their sophistication, but they’re around offenders all the time, sharing
stories and teaching each other about how it works.  Once your bring firearms into it,
it jumps way up in sophistication.”
Id.
310 Public defenders attributed longer interrogations about guns to police desire to get
guns off the streets:
“There is a definite attitude of wanting to get guns off the street, wanting to track
them down: where did they come from?  [W]ho else had the gun?  Tracking guns
down and getting them off the street is a high priority for police, and I see their
interrogations being focused on that.”
Id.
311 Id. at 165–66.
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Theoretically, defendants enjoy the protections of the Due Process
Model, an adversarial system in which procedural safeguards force the
state to prove its case.312  In reality, the justice system more closely re-
sembles the Crime Control Model, an inquisitorial system in which de-
fendants’ confessions lead to guilty pleas.  Confessions greatly tilt the
balance of advantage to the state.313  Prosecutors charge defendants who
confess with more crimes and more serious crimes, set higher bails, and
offer fewer plea concessions than they do with defendants who remain
silent.314  Defense attorneys pressure clients who confessed to accept
guilty pleas because of reduced negotiating leverage.315
Scales recordings have virtually eliminated suppression motions to
challenge juveniles’ statements.316  The paucity of suppression motions
312 PACKER, supra note 13, at 154–73.  The Due Process Model represents a commitment R
to an adversarial process, whereas the Crime Control Model envisions a more inquisitorial
justice system. Id. at 157.  The Due Process model relies on formal fact-finding at trial but-
tressed by procedural safeguards to assure reliable findings of legal guilt. Id. at 163, 166–67.
The Crime Control Model relies on informal, administrative procedures to separate innocent
suspects from probably guilty ones. Id. at 159–60.  It envisions an inquisitorial process, views
the accused as a primary source of evidence, and relies heavily on interrogation and confes-
sions to fuel guilty pleas. Id. at 187–90, 222–223.
313 See Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Implications, 37 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 340–41 (2009) [hereinafter Leo, False Confessions] (“Con-
fessions exert a strong biasing effect . . . because most people assume that a confession[ ] . . .
is, by its very nature, true.”).
314 See Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 114, at 443–44 (“[D]efendants who R
had confessed were less likely to receive a reduction in the number of counts charged against
them[ ] . . . [and] were less likely to receive concessions in plea bargaining.”); Richard J.
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational
Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 984 (1997) (“Defendants who have confessed are likely to
experience greater difficulty making bail[ ] . . . .  If a person has confessed, prosecutors are
likely to file charges[ and] ‘charge high’ . . . .”); see also Cassell & Hayman, supra note 113, R
at 909 (“Defendants who confessed were more likely to be convicted—and more likely to be
convicted of more serious charges—than those who did not.”); David W. Neubauer, Confes-
sions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 109
(1974) (“When a case is pleaded out, those individuals who have confessed receive fewer
concessions from the state than those who have not.”).
315 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 314, at 984 (“[D]efense attorneys are more likely to R
pressure their clients [who confessed] to plead guilty because of the high risk of conviction.”);
see also Neubauer, supra note 314, at 109 (“A confession makes it unlikely that a defendant R
will be found not guilty at a jury trial.  As such, defense attorneys generally recommend
against a trial.); cf. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 23 (“Upon R
confession, prosecutors tend to charge suspects with the highest number and types of offenses,
set bail higher, and are far less likely to initiate or accept a plea bargain to a reduced charge.”).
See generally PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 319–28, 355–59 (1988) (analyzing the effect of defense attorneys on
the guilty plea process).
316 See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 167–68. See generally R
Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 131–32 (“The use of re- R
cordings . . . relieves trial judges from . . . hearing arguments and ruling on admissibility of
evidence . . . .”).
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may be attributed to defense lawyers’ heavy caseloads, lack of resources,
or courtroom cultures hostile to adversarial litigation.317  Even when de-
fense counsel file motions, judges rarely exclude statements.318  Inter-
views with justice system personnel confirmed that defenders filed few
motions to suppress evidence for Miranda violations319 and that Scales
recordings obviated hearings.320
Justice system personnel attributed Scales’s reduction of suppres-
sion motions to several factors.  Police act professionally.321  There is no
ambiguity about warnings and waivers.322  Most juveniles confess, and
the tapes provide unimpeachable evidence.323  Juveniles’ statements lim-
ited defense options and fostered a system of plea bargains, rather than
317 See GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE Miranda, supra note
65, at 53 (“When explaining the reasons for not filing pretrial motions or aggressively trying R
cases, attorneys cited large caseloads, limited time, inadequate training, lack of professional
support . . . , and courthouse culture.”); see also PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUVENILE
JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 51 (1995) (“In one jurisdiction, . . . attorneys
do not file motions in order to maintain a ‘friendly’ atmosphere in the courthouse . . . .”).
318 See GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE Miranda, supra note
65, at 54 (“[M]otions to suppress confessions under Miranda are rarely raised, rarely affect R
convictions, and rarely serve as the basis of successful appeals.”); Cassell, Miranda’s Social
Costs, supra note 114, at 393 (“[S]uppression motions are rarely granted . . . .”). R
319 A prosecutor estimated that she encountered “maybe one or two a year.”  An-
other prosecutor recalled “six omnibus [suppression] hearings which involved state-
ments, none of which involved suppression, in two and a half years.”  One judge
reported “maybe one in the last year,” and another described them as “very infre-
quent, maybe a couple of times a year.”  One defense lawyer said she only filed “a
couple a year,” another said, “In this year, I filed about three of them,” and a third
said, “I’ve had years where I haven’t done it at all, because I haven’t had anything
that’s right for trial.”
FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 167. R
320 An urban judge attributed the paucity of Miranda suppression motions to Scales
recordings:
“We haven’t had all that many cases involving full-scale trials that would involve
Scales tapes. . . .  When I was a defense attorney, these cases went to trial regu-
larly. . . .  Since Scales tapes, I’m finding these cases settle more often than not, so
I’m not seeing it very often.  It’s usually resolved, and I’m not getting those kinds of
cases.”
Id. at 167–68.
321 Id. at 168.
322 A prosecutor observed:
[“]When the issue regarding the Scales interview comes up, there isn’t much to
fight about.  There is a protocol that the police follow, and they read it verbatim. . . .
It’s a standardized protocol.  It’s written, and they follow it fairly tightly.  It’s tight.
We rely on it.  They rely on it.  The juvenile investigators are extremely careful.[”]
Id.
323 See supra notes 246–259 and accompanying text.  One public defender said, “I don’t R
file them [suppression motions] very often, because our kids do such a good job at hanging
themselves.” FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 12, at 168.  A judge commiser- R
ated with public defenders over the obstacles they confront: “I think down here it’s real hard
being a public defender, because if your kid has been in custody, he’s likely cooked his own
goose by the time you get to him.” Id. at 168–69.
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trials, in which the crucial issues involved dispositions rather than guilt
or innocence.324 Scales enables professionals to administer an inquisito-
rial model of justice “on the record,” expedites processing of routine
cases, and reserves court resources for complex cases.325
A. Protecting Youth in the Interrogation Room
Miranda purported to bolster the adversary system and protect citi-
zens,326 but warnings have failed to achieve those goals.327  Post-Mi-
randa decisions have limited its applicability328 and the exclusionary
consequences when police fail to comply.329 Miranda’s protection only
comes into play after police isolate a suspect.330  It requires only an un-
derstanding of the words of the warning,331 and does not extend to collat-
324 One judge observed, “Most of our young people are represented by public defenders
who are real busy.  I think that it’s fair to say that the culture and process down here is sort of
slanted toward making a deal.” Id. at 169.  Another judges confirmed that, in the vast majority
of cases, prosecutors and defense lawyers negotiate dispositions, rather than litigate admissi-
bility of a statement or guilt or innocence:
[“T]hey’ve decided to expend their energy focusing more on settlement and what’s
an appropriate disposition and how to best situate things for their clients. . . .  [I]n a
very large portion of the cases, the focus of things is on can we work out a disposi-
tion that everyone can live with or that particularly the child and defense attorney
can live with.[”]
Id.
325 Id. at 170.
326 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457–58 (1966) (“Unless adequate protective
devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custedial surroundings, no state-
ment obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”).
327 See Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1577 (“A central assumption R
of the Miranda Court was that suspects would understand the warnings and be able to act on
them. . . .  Today’s evidence strongly suggests the contrary . . . .”).
328 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing a “public safety”
exception to Miranda when an emergency need for answers outweighs Miranda’s prophylactic
Fifth Amendment protection); see also Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, R
1577–78 (“[T]he Miranda Court’s high standards for waiver have largely been abrogated by
Davis v. United States and lower court cases extending Davis, as well as by decisions finding
implied waivers of rights if suspects simply answer questions during interrogation.”).
329 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (declining to extend the “fruit
of the poisonous tree” doctrine to the non-testimonial fruits of Miranda violations). Dickerson
recognized the Court’s “subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on
legitimate law enforcement.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
330 E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that police did not need to
warn a suspect before questioning him at a police station because the suspect was free to
leave). See generally Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, supra note 90, at 1592 (“[W]e have a R
Miranda rule that is somewhat limited in reach, which sometimes locates warnings and waiv-
ers within the heart of a highly structured interrogation process, provides admonitions that
many suspects do not understand, and appears not to afford many suspects a meaningful way
to assert their Fifth Amendment rights.  As a prophylactic device to protect suspects’ privilege
against self-incrimination, . . . Miranda is largely dead.”).
331 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 670 (E.D. Va. 2010), aff’d sub nom.,
United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]rom the case law of several Courts of
Appeals[,] . . . the inquiry as to whether a defendant understood the recitation of the Fifth
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eral facts—seriousness of the crime332 or an attorney seeking access333—
or the consequences of waiver.334  A suspect must assert the right to re-
main silent by speaking and making a clear invocation.335
Miranda assumed that a warning would enable suspects to resist
the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation.336  That assumption
is demonstrably false.  Post-Miranda research reports that eighty
percent of adults and ninety percent of juveniles waive their sole
protection in the interrogation room.337  Although Miranda recognized
that those compulsive pressures threaten the adversarial process,338
waivers provide police with a window of opportunity to conduct
an inquisitorial examination.  Perversely, judges focus on ritualistic
compliance with a procedural formality rather than on assessing
the voluntariness or reliability of a statement.339 Miranda remains
Amendment rights focuses . . . on whether the defendant could, merely as a linguistic matter,
comprehend the words spoken to him.”); cf. Collins v. Gaetz, 612 F.3d 574, 588 (7th Cir.
2010) (“It is only when the evidence in the case shows that the defendant could not compre-
hend even the most basic concepts underlying the Miranda warnings that the courts have found
an unintelligent waiver.”). See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000)
(“Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in custody of his right to remain silent
and which will assure the suspect that the exercise of that right will be honored.”).
332 See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987) (“[T]he failure of the law enforce-
ment officials to inform Spring of the subject matter of the interrogation could not affect
Spring’s decision to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant
manner.”).
333 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422–24 (1986) (“Events occurring outside of the
presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capac-
ity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right”).
334 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) (“This Court has never embraced the
theory that a defendant’s ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their
voluntariness.”).
335 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2263 (2010) (holding that a suspect who
speaks has impliedly waived their Fifth Amendment protection).
336 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (requiring warnings to bolster the
privilege against self-incrimination—”the mainstay of our adversary system”—and to protect
“the dignity and integrity of [U.S.] citizens”).
337 See supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text. R
338 384 U.S. at 457–58.  The Court explained:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner.  This atmosphere
carries its own badge of intimidation.  To be sure, this is not physical intimidation,
but it is equally destructive of human dignity.  The current practice of incommuni-
cado interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—
that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself.
Id. (footnote omitted).
339 See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608–09 (2004) (“[G]iving the warning
and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a
statement is involuntary even though given after warnings and a voluntary waiver or rights
requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a
valid waiver.”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was ‘compelled’
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a necessary, but not sufficient, predicate to assure admissible state-
ments.340
Miranda is especially problematic for younger juveniles.  Earlier, I
distinguished between youths’ cognitive ability—capacity to under-
stand—and maturity of judgment—proficiency to make decisions and
exercise rights. Miranda requires only the ability to understand a warn-
ing’s words, which developmental psychologists conclude most sixteen-
and seventeen-year-old youths possess.  In this study, Scales tapes,
waiver forms, and express waivers provide objective evidence that older
delinquents purported to understand warnings, and corroborate develop-
mental psychological research that older juveniles function similarly to
adults.  This consistency inferentially bolsters psychologists’ research
that many, if not most, children fifteen or younger do not understand
Miranda or possess competence to exercise rights.341  Research on false
confessions underscores the unique vulnerability of juveniles, especially
younger ones.342
Analysts attribute younger juveniles’ over-representation among
false confessors to reduced cognitive ability, immaturity, and increased
susceptibility to manipulation.343  They have fewer life experiences, and
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare.”).
340 See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000) (“Miranda an-
nounced a constitutional rule . . . .”).
341 See Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights, supra note 22, at 1153 R
tbl.2; see also Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial, supra note 67, at 356 R
(“[J]uveniles aged 15 and younger are significantly more likely than older adolescents and
young adults to be impaired in ways that compromise their ability to serve as competent de-
fendants in a criminal proceeding.”).
342 See generally Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 945 R
(reporting that youths aged sixteen and seventeen accounted for 16% of false confessions,
while youths aged fifteen or younger accounted for 19%, even though they commit fewer
serious crimes); Gross et al., supra note 120, at 545 (reporting that in a study of exonerations, R
42% of juveniles gave false confessions, compared with only 13% of adults, and among
juveniles fifteen years of age and younger, 69% confessed falsely); Garrett, Judging Inno-
cence, supra note 39, at 88–89 (reporting that false confessions occurred in 16% of cases and R
that juveniles accounted for 39% of false confessors); Joshua A. Tepfer et al., Arresting Devel-
opment: Convictions of Innocent Youth, 62 Rutgers L. Rev. 887, 904 (2010) (studying factors
associated with wrongful convictions of 103 youths—defined as those under the age of
twenty—and reporting that one-third (31.1%) of youthful exonerees gave false confessions, a
rate of false confessions that was almost double that of adult DNA exonerees (17.8%)).
343 Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrong-
ful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 260 (2007); see Bonnie & Grisso, supra note 76, at R
86–93 (“[Y]ouths[ ] . . . may have significant deficits in competence-related abilities due . . . to
developmental immaturity.”); Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children and Adoles-
cents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 107, 114 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed.,
2004) [hereinafter Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of Children] (examining research
showing an inverse relationship between age and suggestibility); Ann Tobey et al., Youths’
Trial Participation as Seen by Youths and Their Attorneys: An Exploration of Competence-
Based Issues, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE
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societal expectations of obedience to authority create pressures to
waive.344  They are more likely than adults to tell police what they think
the police want to hear.345  The stress of interrogation intensifies their
desire to extricate themselves by waiving and confessing without consid-
ering long-term consequences.346  When interrogating juveniles, police
do not make allowances for these developmental differences.347  Instead,
the tactics employed against youths are those designed to manipulate
adults: aggressive questioning, presenting false evidence, and leading
225, 231–34 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G Schwartz eds., 2000) (discussing how juveniles are
difficult clients for attorneys because they have difficulty remembering information, maintain-
ing attention, and making decisions appropriatly).
344 Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 944 (summarizing R
reasons why juveniles exhibit unique vulnerabilities when interrogated); Drizin & Luloff,
supra note 343, at 260; see MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 77 R
(“[M]any juvenile suspects may find arrest and detention at the police station a distressing and
frightening experience which may render them psychologically vulnerable . . . .”); Redlich et
al., The Police Interrogation of Children, supra note 343, at 114 (“[I]t is likely that suggestible R
persons are more apt to confess in response to psychologically oriented interrogation tactics.”).
345 See LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 233 R
(“Many juveniles . . . are highly compliant.  They tend to be . . . acquiescent[ ] and eager to
please . . . when questioned by police.”); see also GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTER-
ROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS supra note 80, at 381 (summarizing research which showed R
juveniles are “markedly more suggestible than adults” when subjected to interrogative pres-
sure). See generally Bull, Investigative Interviewing of Children, supra note 109, at 13 (dis- R
cussing how interviewers are more likely to produce accurate responses from children if they
ask questions in a supportive manner rather than a formal or authoritative manner); Thomas D.
Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1004 (1999) (examining and critiquing research into children’s suggestibility in the context of
sexual abuse allegations).
346 See EVANS, THE CONDUCT OF POLICE INTERVIEWS, supra note 118, at 4 (“[J]uveniles R
find arrest and detention a distressing and frightening experience.  This may render suspects
psychologically vulnerable . . . [to] readily admit to offences in order to obtain as quick a
release as a possible . . . .”); GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, EVALUATING CAPACITY TO WAIVE
Miranda, supra note 65, at 63 (“[Y]outh may be particularly willing to risk the potential long- R
term negative consequences of waiving rights for the positive consequence of ending an un-
pleasant interrogation and potentially being released.”); Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 17, R
at 295 (“[T]o the extent that adolescents value the present more than the future and are stressed
in the current [interrogation] condition, the likelihood that they will confess in exchange for
the hoped-for departure from the situation increases.”); see also Allison D. Redlich, False
Confessions, False Guilty Pleas: Similarities and Differences, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 49, 53
(G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (identifying juveniles’ “inability to
consider long-term consequences” as a factor increasing their likelihood of falsely confessing
in interrogations).
347 Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note 17, at 294. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\23-2\CJP201.txt unknown Seq: 62 28-APR-14 13:30
456 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 23:395
questions348—tactics that may create unique dangers in the juvenile in-
terrogation context.349
The Supreme Court in Haley, Gallegos, Gault, Michael C., Alva-
rado, and J.D.B. either excluded or reversed and remanded judgments
affirming the admittance of statements taken from youths fifteen years of
age350 or younger351 and admitted those obtained from sixteen-352 and
seventeen-year-olds.353 Haley and Gallegos recognized that children’s
immaturity and inexperience increased the likelihood of involuntary con-
fessions.354 J.D.B. reaffirmed that youthfulness heightened susceptibility
to coercion.355  The Court’s decisions create a de facto line that distin-
guishes between youths fifteen and younger and those sixteen and older
and closely tracks psychologists’ research about youths’ cognitive ability
and competence.  State courts, legislatures, and policy makers should
formally adopt that functional line between older and younger juveniles.
More than three decades ago, the American Bar Association recom-
mended, “The right to counsel should attach as soon as the juvenile is
taken into custody by an agent of the state, when a petition is filed
against the juvenile, or when the juvenile appears personally at an intake
348 See Owen-Kostelnik et. al, supra note 17, at 291, 295 (discussing the use of adult R
interrogation tactics on children and adolescents); see also Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey,
When Police Question Children: Are Protections Adequate?, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS.
151, 156–57 (1999) (comparing the unacceptability of leading questions in interviews of child
victims with their common use in interrogations of child suspects); cf. INBAU ET AL., supra
note 102, at 298 (asserting that the principles of adult interrogation may be applied to juvenile R
suspects).
349 See Barbara Kaban & Ann E. Tobey, When Police Question Children: Are Protections
Adequate?, 1 J. CENTER FOR CHILD. & CTS. 151, 158 (1999) (“Interrogation procedures de-
signed for adults but used with children increase the likelihood of false confessions and may
even undermine the integrity of the fact-finding process.”); Owen-Kostelnik et al., supra note
17, at 291–96 (discussing the effects of adult interrogation tactics on children and adoles- R
cents); see also David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Youth of the
Accused”: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOL-
OGY 641, 671–77 (2002) (relating the case of Lacresha Murray, an eleven-year-old charged
with homicide in 1996 based on her confession following a “controversial” two-and-a-half-
hour interrogation). See generally Allison D. Redlich, Double Jeopardy in the Interrogation
Room: Young Age and Mental Illness, 62 AM. PSYCHOL. 609, 610 (2007) (arguing that the risk
of false confessions by juveniles is heightened by the prevalence of mental-health issues in
juvenile arrestees).
350 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4–6, 56 (1966); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600–01 (1948)
(plurality opinion).
351 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399–400, 2408 (2011); Gallegos v. Colo-
rado, 370 U.S. 49, 54–55 (1962).
352 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726–28 (1979).
353 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 656–58, 668–69 (2004).
354 Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54–55; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599–600; see also King, supra note
29, at 458 (“[C]hildren are different from adults and require protection from their youth when R
enmeshed with law enforcement.  This is the teaching of Haley and Gallegos.”).
355 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402–03 (“[A] child’s age ‘would have affected how a reasonable
person’ in the suspect’s position ‘would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’” (quoting Stans-
bury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994))).
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conference, whichever occurs first.”356  The ABA endorsed mandatory,
non-waivable appointment of counsel because it recognized “[f]ew
juveniles have the experience and understanding to decide meaningfully
that the assistance of counsel would not be helpful.”357  Contemporary
analysts argue that younger juveniles “should be accompanied and ad-
vised by a professional advocate, preferably an attorney, trained to serve
in this role.”358  Requiring a child to consult an attorney assures an in-
formed and voluntary waiver.359
If youths fifteen or younger consult with counsel, it will somewhat
limit police’s ability to secure confessions.  However, if younger
juveniles cannot understand or exercise rights without legal assistance,
then to treat them as if they do denies fundamental fairness and enables
the state to exploit their vulnerability.  Constitutional rights exist to as-
sure factual accuracy, promote equality, and protect individuals from
governmental over-reaching, and inevitably diminish somewhat the
state’s ability to fight crime.360 Michael C. emphasized lawyer’s unique
role in the Miranda framework,361 and Haley, Gallegos, and Gault rec-
ognized younger juveniles’ exceptional need for their assistance.362
B. Limiting the Length of Interrogations
The Court has recognized that lengthy interrogations produce invol-
untary confessions363 and that prolonged questioning of juveniles can co-
356 CHARLES Z. SMITH ET AL., IJA–ABA JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 89 (1980) (emphasis added).
357 Id. at 92.
358 Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 30 (citation omitted). R
359 See Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adoles-
cent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L.
REV. 125, 149 (2007) (“[Y]outhfulness supports a per se rule prohibiting juveniles from waiv-
ing either the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the interrogation room
or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in delinquency proceedings.  In both contexts, the
assistance of counsel should be mandatory.”); Drizin & Luloff, supra note 343, at 313 (“The R
best practice to ensure accuracy in confessions and knowing and intelligent waivers of counsel
is to require a per se rule that children cannot waive their Miranda rights without first consult-
ing an attorney.”).
360 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) (“No system worth preserving
should have to fear that if an accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become
aware of, and exercise, these rights.  If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that
system.” (footnote omitted)).
361 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) (“[T]he lawyer occupies a critical posi-
tion in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of
a client undergoing custodial interrogation.”).
362 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962);
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948).
363 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153–55 (1944) (holding involuntary a con-
fession obtained only after thirty-six hours of nearly continuous interrogation).
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erce a statement.364  Policy-makers should create a sliding-scale
presumption of involuntariness or examine more closely a confession’s
reliability as length of questioning increases.  Police concluded ninety
percent of these felony interrogations in less than thirty minutes.365
Every study reports that police complete most interrogations in less than
an hour, and few take as long as two hours.366  By contrast, interroga-
tions that elicit false confessions are typically lengthy proceedings that
wear down an innocent person’s resistance.367  Prolonged interrogation,
especially in conjunction with youthfulness, mental retardation, or other
psychological vulnerabilities, is strongly associated with false confes-
sions and may reach a tipping point after more than a few hours.368
I cannot prescribe outer time limits because I did not encounter ei-
ther lengthy or factually problematic interrogations.  However, states
should create a sliding-scale presumption that police elicited involuntary
confession as the length of questioning increases.  If police complete
nearly all felony interrogations in less than one hour and extract most
false confessions only after grilling suspects for six hours or longer,369
then these times provide parameters to limit interrogations and
strengthen the presumption of coercion.370  Four hours provides ample
opportunity to obtain true confessions from guilty suspects willing to talk
364 Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599–601 (1948).
365 Supra Table 6.
366 See Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 16; supra notes R
282–291 and accompanying text. R
367 See Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 948–49 (“Of R
the [false confessions] in which the length of interrogation was either reported or could be
determined[,] . . . [t]he average length of interrogation was 16.3 hours, and the median length
of interrogation was twelve hours.”); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 314, at 998 (“Some persons are R
not able to withstand the intensity of interrogation.  [I]ts length may fatigue and debilitate an
otherwise normal individual[ ] . . . .”); supra note 280 and accompanying text; cf. INBAU ET R
AL., supra note 102, at 597 (“[R]arely will a competent interrogator require more than approxi- R
mately four hours to obtain a confession from an offender, even in cases of a very serious
nature. . . .  Most cases require considerably fewer than four hours.”).
368 See White, False Confessions and the Constitution, supra note 174, at 143 (“[A]n R
interrogation’s length seems directly related to its likelihood of producing a false confession.
In nearly all of the documented cases involving false confessions by suspects of normal intelli-
gence, the interrogation proceeded for several hours, generally more than six.”); see also
Drizin & Leo, The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 944–45, 948–49 (finding R
that “[m]ost false confessions in our sample come from the young” and only 16% lasted less
than six hours); GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 120, at 21 (“These forty R
false confessions are unique and unusual. . . .  [A]lmost all of [their] interrogations were pro-
longed affairs, lasting many hours or even days.  Fourteen of these exonerees were mentally
retarded, three were mentally ill, and thirteen were juveniles.”).
369 Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 39, at 16. R
370 See, e.g., id. at 28 (recommending police departments set interrogation time limits and
require periodic breaks); White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 284, at 1233 (“Regardless of R
the interrogation practices employed, an interrogation should not be allowed to extend beyond
some prescribed limit, say six hours.”).
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without increasing the risk of eliciting false confessions from innocent
people.
C. On the Record
Within the past decade, legal scholars, psychologists, law enforce-
ment, and justice system personnel have reached a consensus that record-
ing reduces coercion, diminishes dangers of false confessions, and
increases reliability.371  Since Alaska and Minnesota mandated record-
ings, thirteen more states and the District of Columbia have required po-
lice to record interrogations,372 although some only under limited
circumstances.373  Many police departments have policies to record inter-
rogations for some crimes.374
An objective record provides an independent basis to resolve dis-
putes between police and defendants about Miranda warnings, waivers,
or statements.375  A complete record enables the fact finder to decide
371 See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need
for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and
Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619, 639–45  (2004) (gathering positive sup-
port for mandatory interrogation taping from state commissions, the ABA, state legislatures,
state supreme courts, and law enforcement agencies); Sullivan, The Time Has Come, supra
note 123, at 178 (“Of the hundreds of experienced detectives to whom we have spoken who R
have given custodial recording a fair try, we have yet to speak with one who wants to revert to
non-recording. . . .  [M]any state prosecutors in communities where recordings are made[ ] . . .
too are outspoken supporters of custodial recordings.”); see, e.g., GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS supra note 80, at 22 (“[T]ape-recording, or video- R
recording, of police interviews protects the police against false allegations as well as protecting
the suspect against police impropriety.”); MILNE & BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra
note 10, at 183–84; Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost R
Confessions—And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 553–55 [hereinafter
Cassell, Protecting the Innocent]; Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 39, at 91, at 122; R
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1113–15
(2010) [hereinafter Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions]; Kassin et al., Police-Induced
Confessions, supra note 39, at 25–27; LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, R
supra note 92, at 296–303; Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at R
130–32.
372 Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 127–28; see also R
LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, supra note 92, at 320–21; SULLIVAN, R
POLICE EXPERIENCES, supra note 123, at 27–28; Sullivan, The Time Has Come, supra note R
123, at 176–77. R
373 Illinois originally only recorded interrogations in homicide investigations, Sullivan,
The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 22, at 128, but has recently begun recording R
interrogations of people suspected of other violent crimes.  Dan Hinkel, Recording of Cop
Interrogations Widened: Quinn Signs Bill in Wake of False Confessions, Wrongful Convic-
tions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 2013, at C5.
374 See Sullivan, The Time Has Come, supra note 123, at 182–87.  Departmental policies R
may limit recordings to certain classes of felonies like homicides, violent crimes, or serious
felonies. Id. at 178.
375 See Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 130–31 R
(“[P]retrial motions to suppress statements and confessions are drastically reduced because
there is usually no room for dispute as to what happened.  Police officers . . . are spared hostile
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whether a statement contains facts known to a guilty perpetrator or sup-
plied by police to an innocent suspect during questioning.376  Recordings
protect police from false claims of abuse.377  It enables police to focus on
suspects’ responses, to review details of an interview not captured in
written notes, and to test them against subsequently discovered facts.378
It avoids distortions when interviewers rely on memory or notes to sum-
marize a statement.379  Police officers who have switched to recording
interviews unanimously express no desire to revert to non-recording.380
A recorded confession enables prosecutors to avoid suppression hear-
ings, negotiate better pleas, and obtain convictions.381  It allows defense
lawyers to review recordings, rather than rely on clients’ imperfect recol-
lection of a stressful event.  It generates substantial savings because po-
lice, prosecutors, and defense counsel do not have to prepare for
suppression hearings and judges do not have to conduct them.382
cross examinations about failing to give Miranda warnings[ ] . . . .”); see also Drizin & Leo,
The Problem of False Confessions, supra note 81, at 997 (“[T]aping leads to a higher level of R
scrutiny (by police officials as well as others) that will deter police misconduct during interro-
gation, improve the quality of interrogation practices, and thus increase the ability of police to
separate the innocent from the guilty.”); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 309, 316 (2003) [hereinafter Slobogin, Toward Taping] (“[A]n exact accounting of
interrogation events—from the way the warnings are given to the precise nature of any threats,
promises, and deceptions that occur—is needed to determine whether statements are voluntary
in the totality of the circumstances.”).
376 See Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, supra note 371, at 1058 (“When R
custodial interrogations are not recorded in their entirety, one cannot easily discern whether
facts were volunteered by the suspect or disclosed by law enforcement.”); White, False Con-
fessions and the Constitution, supra note 174, at 153–55 (arguing for recording to evaluate R
whether police communicated critical facts to suspect); see, e.g., GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT, supra note 120, at 28–31 (describing how police can contaminate suspects’ state- R
ments unknowingly).
377 See Sullivan, The Time Has Come, supra note 123, at 178 (“[R]ecordings protect R
officers from claims of misconduct, and practically eliminate motions to suppress based on
alleged police use of overbearing, unlawful tactics[ ] . . . .”); see, e.g., Sullivan, The Wisdom of
Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 134 (quoting one police officer as saying that record- R
ings have disproved many false allegations by suspects).
378 Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, supra note 113, at 683; Sullivan, The Time Has R
Come, supra note 123, at 178–79; see, e.g., Drizin & Reich, supra note 371, at 625 (discussing R
how Charles O’Hara, a criminal investigator and police investigation manual author, would
obtain voluntary confessions by interrogating suspects and then confronting them with record-
ings of their alibis’ inconsistencies and contradictions).
379 See Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 130; cf. MILNE R
& BULL, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING, supra note 10, at 26–30 (describing how the cognitive R
demands of questioning can hinder and distort interviewers’ memory of information learned in
interrogations).
380 Sullivan, The Time Has Come, supra note 123, at 178–79; see, e.g., Sullivan, The R
Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 133–34. R
381 Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 114, at 489 (arguing that recording does R
not adversely affect any legitimate law enforcement interests and provides prosecutors with
more convincing evidence with which to negotiate better pleas and obtain convictions); Sulli-
van, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 131. R
382 Sullivan, The Wisdom of Custodial Recordings, supra note 123, at 130–32. R
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Police must record all conversations—including preliminary inter-
views and interrogations, not just suspects’ final statements—for it to be
an effective safeguard.383  Otherwise, police may conduct pre-interroga-
tion interviews, elicit incriminating information, and then record a final
confession after the “cat is out of the bag”384—a variation of the practice
condemned in Missouri v. Siebert.385  Only a complete record of every
interaction can protect against a final statement that ratifies an earlier
coerced one or against a false confession contaminated by non-public
facts that police supplied a suspect.386
CONCLUSION
Recordings provide an opportunity to systematically examine what
happens in the interrogation room and to adopt policies based on knowl-
edge rather than surmise.  The Supreme Court repeatedly insists that
American criminal and juvenile justice is an adversary system.387  Such
repeated assertions do not alter the reality that states decide most defend-
ants’ guilt in an inquisitorial setting.  Most defendants seal their fate in
the interrogation room, rendering trial procedures a nullity.  Interrogation
elicits confessions, and confessions produce guilty pleas.388  Concern
about reliability requires procedures to prevent miscarriages of justice
such as false confessions and wrongful convictions.  Because states do
not provide full adversarial testing in every felony case, we need stronger
mechanisms to assure factual reliability of inquisitorial justice and elicit
true confessions from guilty people.
383 See GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS supra
note 80, at 23 (arguing that recording all questioning is necessary to understand what really R
occurred during interrogation); Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50
RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2026 (1998) [hereinafter White, What Is an Involuntary] (proposing
that police record all communications between suspects and interrogators to enable judges to
determine whether the police provided suspects with unique facts during untaped interactions).
384 See Slobogin, Toward Taping, supra note 375, at 315. R
385 542 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (opinion of Souter, J.) (describing “two-stage interroga-
tions,” where an officer questions an unwarned suspect, obtains an incriminating statement,
then reads the suspect a Miranda warning and asks them to repeat the statement).
386 See GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, supra note 120, at 22–33 (describing the R
process of contamination that can occur during interrogation); White, False Confessions and
the Constitution, supra note 174, at 132 n. 192 (“[I]n the absence of . . . the complete transcript R
. . . , courts generally should not accept the government’s assertion that a confession is reliable
because of the facts about the defendant’s knowledge that it reveals.”); see also Kassin, The
Psychology of Confession Evidence, supra note 94, at 230 (explaining how even objective R
videos of interviews can create bias in the viewer); White, What Is an Involuntary, supra note
383, at 2024–26 (endorsing a requirement that suspects’ confessions be corroborated by inde- R
pendent evidence to assure the trustworthiness of taped confessions).
387 For instance, Miranda required the warning “to make the individual more acutely
aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system—that he is not in the presence of
persons acting solely in his interest.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
388 See PACKER, supra note 13, at 161 (explaining how the Crime Control Model of crimi- R
nal justice’s “informal administrative fact-finding” creates a presumption of guilt).
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For more than half a century, the Court’s limited and ineffectual
forays into this arena have allowed public officials to evade their respon-
sibility to assure the fairness and accuracy of the justice system.  The
judicial and legislative abdication reflects the “recognition that virtually
any alternative that meets Miranda’s concerns about custodial pressures
will impose infinitely greater burdens on law enforcement than do the
Miranda rules themselves.”389  Recording imposes no great burden on
police, illuminates the inner-workings of the interrogation room, and pro-
vides an objective record on which a defendant may appeal to a judge.
Because the vast majority of defendants will not receive a trial, judicial
review of the record provides an alternative means to assure the fairness
and reliability of routine felony justice.
389 Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect, supra note 114, at 560. R
